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Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on seasoned equity offerings and aims to examine announcement effects 
and long-run performance of SEO firms on the Swedish stock exchanges, during the recovery 
phase of the global financial crisis. Also, an OLS regression is run in order to explain post-
SEO performance using the independent variables book-to-market ratio, market capitalization 
and the firms’ number of SEOs during the time period.  
 
The study takes on a deductive approach measuring and analyzing SEO firms’ performance, 
meaning that hypotheses are deduced based on earlier research and theory. Earlier studies and 
theory generally suggest negative announcement effects, along with long-run 
underperformance of firms that issue seasoned equity.  
 
The sample consists of Swedish firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm and First North. 
More specifically, the sample includes a total of 123 observations measuring announcement 
effects and 81 observations measuring long-run performance. The results generated by the 
study show clear signs of negative announcement effects and long-run underperformance for 
Swedish SEO firms during the time period. However, long-run underperformance cannot be 
concluded for SEO firms listed on First North during the time period. Moreover, the 
independent variable for number of SEOs is negatively significant for firms listed on 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. The results suggest that signaling theories, which say that an 
SEO has a negative impact on firm value, are applicable on the Swedish stock markets. 
Furthermore, interpreting the results hint that the markets have not been efficient in terms of 
initial re-evaluation of stock prices after information of SEO announcements. 
 
 
Keywords: Seasoned Equity Offering, SEO, Announcement Effects, Long-Run Performance, 
Event Study, Cumulative Abnormal Return, Market Efficiency, Swedish Stock Markets.   
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1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter aims to give the reader an introduction to the subject that the thesis covers. The 
chapter begins with a background and thereafter continues with a problem discussion. 
Furthermore, the chapter describes the research purpose, which is summed up by stating the 
research questions of the study. Lastly, research limitations, definitions of important terms, 
and the outline for the rest of the thesis is provided. 
 
1.1 Background 
 
In September 2008, the fourth-largest investment bank in USA, Lehman Brothers, filed for 
bankruptcy. The financial crisis escalated and the panic in the financial markets multiplied. 
That being said, corporations’ access to the debt markets became more complicated and firms 
were to a lower extent able to trust borrowing as an external financing source 
(Economist.com, 2013). This reality for corporations spread worldwide with the global 
financial crisis. Furthermore, the crisis had a substantial negative impact on GDP, which in 
turn hints that firms in general would realize increased difficulties to generate internal funds. 
Thus, the arising complexity in the debt market, along with generally decreased cash inflows, 
oftentimes left companies to rely on the equity markets to raise capital. Moreover, in 2009 the 
European Commission flagged for short-run losses and medium- to long-run uncertainties 
regarding the recovery of the crisis. They forecasted investments to decline by around ten 
percent in 2009 in the Eurozone (European Commission, 2009).  The expanding uncertainties 
and declining investment forecasts were going to affect investor confidence in the stock 
market during the coming years (Vigna, 2014). In other words, firms experienced an 
increased need of equity, which coincided with uncertainties among investors. This, in turn, 
would potentially lead to spectacular years in the equity markets following the global crisis. 
 
Sweden, as a member of OECD and EU-27, is generally considered a healthy economy in 
terms of GDP per capita, productivity and inflation (moodys.com, 2014).  Also, Sweden has 
showed historically that it is able to recover from crises, and quickly retain higher growth 
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rates than pre-crisis levels (European Commission, 2009). Thus, Sweden can be viewed as an 
indicator of strong performance for a developed economy. An additional indicator of recent 
strong performance is that the number of Swedish seasoned equity offerings reached a record 
high level in 2013, which proves that investors’ risk appetite for Swedish firms has recovered 
after the latest financial crisis (di.se, 2014). Therefore, performance of the Swedish equity 
markets is of important interest for several parties within the Eurozone and other developed 
markets. 
In summary, the global financial crisis complicated the equity markets, potentially changing 
the assumptions and theories of future stock return. Therefore, this thesis evaluates stock 
return for a firm post SEO, which is one measure of equity market performance in total. The 
study focuses on firms listed on the Swedish equity markets, which represent strong 
performance in the recovery phase of a crisis. 
 
1.2  Problem Discussion 
 
Earlier research has shown that firms performing Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) 
significantly underperform. Different studies have separately showed that underperformance 
occur both short-term after announcement relative the firm’s own historical “normal” return, 
and long-run relative the market. In an investor perspective, it is important that a study 
includes not only firm performance relative its own historical performance, but also 
performance relative the market, which in this study is represented by a stock index. Although 
an economic raw return is positive for investors, it is more relevant to measure performance 
compared to an index. This is due to rational investors’ desire to always invest in assets 
generating the highest return, given their risk appetite. If an individual stock’s return does not 
beat the generally less risky market return, it is considered an underperformance. 
 
Historically, several methods have been used to analyze firm performance, but it is generally 
explained by the same theories. Performance is usually measured with changes in the market 
value of the stock. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and Masulis and Korwar (1986) are examples 
of early studies showing that the market responds negatively to a firm’s announcement of an 
SEO. These results are partly explained by the signaling model and the adverse selection 
model
1
, suggesting that the firm’s real reason of issuing equity is poor confidence in future 
                                                          
1
 Both models defined in section 2.5.2 Signaling with SEOs. 
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cash flows and that the stock is overvalued, respectively. This signaling goes in line with 
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory, saying that firms only turn to the equity 
markets when internal funds and debt are unavailable. If a negative announcement effect is 
followed up by long-run underperformance, the market did not fully adjust the stock price at 
the time of the equity offering announcement. Thus, the market is not fully efficient 
responding to the information of an equity issue, which leads to that the firm underperforms 
in a longer perspective as well (Loughran & Ritter, 1995; Spiess & Affleck-Graves, 1995). 
However, Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004) and Billet, Flannery, and Garfinkel (2011) 
are examples of studies that for different reasons have critiqued the assumptions of 
underperformance related to an equity issue. The negative announcement effect may be due to 
the firm’s historical conditions leading to the SEO-decision (Carlson et al., 2004), while long-
run underperformance may be due to later financial and operational decisions (Billet et al., 
2011). Hence, the underperformance may not be due to the SEO itself. 
 
The studies mentioned above cover SEOs in time periods including both economic booms and 
recessions, leading to an overall neutral economic situation. Moreover, they include only 
firms listed on the exchanges in USA. With the financial crisis in mind, it is first now possible 
to measure announcement effects and long-run performance of Swedish listed firms in the 
recovery phase of the crisis. Also, earlier studies have naturally focused on historical time 
periods that today may be viewed as old. Therefore, the continuously developing stock 
market, along with potential changes in the markets due to the financial crisis, may lead to 
results that possibly challenge the results and applied theories of earlier studies. 
 
1.3 Research Purpose 
 
With inspiration from earlier research, this study aims to evaluate announcement effects and 
long-run performance of firms’ stock return after SEO in the recovery phase of the financial 
crisis, including all Swedish firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm and NASDAQ OMX 
First North.  Announcement effect is defined as the market reaction within the event window 
of the official announcement of equity issue. The actual return in the event window is 
compared to expected return of the stock, which in turn generates daily abnormal return. 
Long-run performance is referred to as the three-year monthly stock return, compared to 
index for the same time period. The purpose of evaluating two different time dimensions is to 
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broaden the analysis of earlier studies in the area, and hence, generate results covering a larger 
picture of firms’ performance after decision to perform an SEO. After concluding the results 
of performance, the secondary purpose of this study is attempting to explain the under- or 
over-performance by running a regression. The dependent variable is Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR), which represents long-run performance for the observations post equity 
offering. The independent variables used to explain the dependent variable are book-to-
market ratio, size (market capitalization), and a dummy variable for the number of SEOs 
during the study’s time period.  
 
To sum up, the purpose of this study is to measure, analyze, and answer the following 
research questions for the mentioned sample and time period: 
 
1. “Did the official announcement of an SEO lead to a negative market reaction?"  
2. “Did SEO firms underperform in a three-year perspective following the last issuing date?” 
3. “Did the mentioned independent variables have a significant effect on performance? If so, 
how did these independent variables impact performance?” 
 
1.4 Research Limitations 
 
As for SEOs, there have been several studies on firms’ performance following Initial Public 
Offering (IPO). Ritter (1991) showed that IPOs on the American stock exchanges in 1975-
1984 underperformed in a long-run perspective relative the market, and several studies 
thereafter have showed similar results. Despite that IPOs is a form of an equity issue as well, 
this study focuses strictly on SEOs. For the same reason, other equity-like financing such as 
convertible debt, called “backdoor” equity financing by Stein (1992), is also excluded from 
this study.  
 
Moreover, there are several research areas related to SEOs that may affect the post-
announcement performance. Firstly, the benefits and costs to bring in an underwriter
2
 to be 
responsible for the issue were analyzed by Eckbo and Masulis (1992). Although the 
                                                          
2 A financial institution acting as a financial intermediary between firms and investors, verifying the quality of 
information (Ogden, Jen, and O’Connor, 2003). 
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underwriting fees may be considered expensive, the benefits of a successful SEO exceed the 
costs when certain circumstances are fulfilled (Eckbo & Masulis, 1992). Also, the actual role 
of the underwriter is an important research area within SEOs (Ogden, Jen, and O’Connor, 
2003).  
 
Furthermore, there is evidence that firms oftentimes manage or even manipulate their earnings 
before the offering. For example, Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) provide evidence of this 
managing/manipulation and explain a substantial negative relationship between pre-issue 
earnings management and post-issue stock performance. However, due to limitations in time 
and resources, the above mentioned research areas are not touched upon in this study.  
 
1.5 Definitions 
 
In order to give the reader an initial and basic understanding of the subject, the most central 
term, Seasoned Equity Offering, is defined below. Also, Initial Public Offering is defined in 
order to avoid confusion between these two main types of equity offerings. 
 
 Initial Public Offering (IPO): An external financing source. The process when a firm 
sells stock to the public for the first time (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011). 
 Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO): Also an external financing source. More specifically, 
when firms return to the equity markets and issue additional shares for sale. There are 
two main types of SEOs; cash offer, which means that the firm offers new shares to all 
potential investors, and rights offer, which means that the firm turns to existing 
shareholders for additional equity (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011). In this thesis, seasoned 
equity offering, equity offering, and equity issue are used as synonym terms for an SEO 
(plural: SEOs), including both cash- and rights offer. Also, the term SEO firms is used 
throughout the thesis and it is defined as all firms that issue equity during the time period. 
 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
 
The outline for the rest of this thesis is as follows: chapter 2 presents a literature and 
theoretical review, covering corporate finance theories associated with seasoned equity 
offerings, along with earlier research within the topic. Chapter 3 covers the methodology used 
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to answer the research questions. Also, chapter 3 presents a methodological discussion. 
Thereafter, chapter 4 presents and describes the results and findings of the study. 
Furthermore, chapter 5 analyzes the results in terms of earlier research and theories, along 
with presenting a discussion based on the analysis. The ending chapter 6 aims to conclude the 
research questions and describes further research that the authors recommend. 
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2 Literature and Theoretical Review 
 
 
This chapter covers corporate finance theories associated with seasoned equity offerings. 
Moreover, results of earlier studies examining announcement effects and long-run 
performance are presented. Also, independent variables used in earlier research to explain 
performance are explained. Lastly, the hypothesis testing in this study is presented. 
 
2.1 Why Firms Need Capital 
 
Firms are continuously in need of capital to fund operations, investment opportunities, 
amortization of debt, etc. The fundamental choice is whether to raise capital from internal or 
external sources. Historical profits are the source of internal capital, and using that increases 
the firm’s financial leverage by decreasing equity (ceteris paribus). External capital is raised 
by pure debt, pure equity or mixtures of the two, and comes from sources outside the firm. 
The decision of financing source naturally has an impact on the firm’s capital structure. 
(Hillier, Grinblatt, and Titman, 2011) 
 
2.2 Capital Structure 
 
Historically, several theories have been developed trying to determine the most preferable 
capital structure for a firm. Modigliani and Miller (1958 & 1963), Miller (1977), Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973), and Myers and Majluf (1984) are key examples that have presented 
well-known capital structure theories.  
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) present that the market value of a firm is constant regardless of 
its capital structure. The authors prove their theory explaining that increased financial 
leverage comes with higher financial risk, offsetting the impact on cost of capital.  Therefore, 
a constant cost of capital independent of financial leverage is concluded. If this does not hold, 
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the authors explain that profitable arbitrage opportunities arise in the markets
3
. However, this 
theory assumes perfect capital markets, which do not hold in reality (Ogden et al., 2003). In 
Modigliani and Miller (1963), the authors correct their own theory from 1958 in terms of tax 
advantages for debt financing. When the tax deductibility of interest costs is taken into 
account, there is an advantage of debt financing over equity financing. Although the 
occurrence of corporate taxation suggests that debt financing is cheaper than equity financing 
for firms, the authors mention that corporations should not seek to only issue debt in their 
capital structure. They also briefly introduce that retained earnings (i.e. internal financing) 
may be cheaper in some circumstances, even when corporate taxation is taken into account 
(Miller & Modigliani, 1963). Moreover, Miller (1977) introduces another violation of perfect 
capital markets, explaining the relationship between personal taxation and capital structure. 
Adding the role of personal taxation, the tax benefits of corporate taxation potentially 
disappear (Miller, 1977).  
 
Using the theories created by Modigliani and Miller, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) 
developed the traditional tradeoff theory of capital structure. The tradeoff between tax 
advantages of debt financing and a positive relationship between leverage and financial 
distress costs, leads to an optimal debt-to-equity ratio for every corporation, which maximizes 
firm value. The traditional tradeoff theory has later been revised, including variables such as 
costs associated with management overinvestment, business erosion, and investor conflicts 
(Ogden et al., 2003). However, the view that corporations should aim for a unique and 
optimal capital structure, by weighting costs and benefits of the financing alternatives, retains. 
Summing up the tradeoff theories, debt financing is preferable over equity up to a certain 
degree of financial leverage. Also, it should be highlighted that the specific optimal capital 
structure differs between corporations. 
 
Donaldson (1961) and Myers and Majluf (1984) present the pecking order theory, which 
challenges the tradeoff theories of capital structure. The pecking order theory explains a 
financing hierarchy of financing sources, where internal financing is the most preferable one, 
followed by debt and equity, respectively. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), the 
pecking order theory can be summed up with the following hierarchy of financing sources: 
 
                                                          
3
 More specifically, through buying and selling stocks and bonds, investors will be able to earn risk-free income 
streams, which eventually restore the stated equality. 
9 
 
1. Internal funds or risk-free debt 
2. Risky debt 
3. Hybrids of debt and equity 
4. Pure equity 
 
The underlying reason for this order is that the lower transaction costs, information 
asymmetry and adverse selection costs related to the financing source, the better it is for firm 
value. Thus, according to the pecking-order theory, debt is always preferable over equity due 
to its lower transaction costs, information asymmetry and adverse selection costs.  
 
2.3 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
 
Although EMH is closely linked to theories from the 1800s, it is generally considered 
formulated by Fama (1970). A market is considered efficient when the market price of the 
security fully reflect the rational value of the security (Ogden et al., 2003). Fama (1970) 
argues for three types of market efficiencies:  
 
 “Weak form” efficiency: The security’s price reflects information related to its 
historical prices or return sequences. 
 “Semi strong form” efficiency: The security’s price reflects all available information 
that is obvious to the public. 
 “Strong form” efficiency: The security’s price reflects all public and private 
information. 
 
Moreover, EMH assumes that the market reacts immediately to information, adjusting the 
market price continuously when new information is available (Fama, 1970). Intuitively, this 
means that illiquid markets are less efficient than liquid markets. For instance, on a stock 
exchange where the shares are not traded frequently, the market price of a stock may not be 
reevaluated and adjusted immediately after new information is available. 
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2.4 When do Firms Issue Equity? 
 
According to the pecking order theory, corporations would only issue equity when other 
financing sources are unavailable. One situation when a firm typically issues equity is when 
they are facing poor historical and current performance. Issuing stock then gives the business 
hope for the future (Masulis & Korwar, 1986).  
 
However, Fama and French (2005) violate the pecking order predictions, presenting that 67 
percent of their sample firms during the time period 1973-1982 made some type of equity 
issue
4
 every year. This number increases to 74 percent for 1982-1992, and to 86 percent for 
1993-2002. Furthermore, Fama and French (2005) argue that the typical firm issuing equity is 
not facing significant financial distress. However, the authors mean that pure SEOs are 
infrequent, but are large in size when they actually occur. The large size of the SEOs means 
that they are substantial portions of total equity issues, particularly for smaller firms.  
 
2.5 Market Reactions to Seasoned Equity Offerings 
 
As mentioned, when firms issue equity, their capital structure changes. Also, assuming that 
EMH holds, the market will react to the information and reevaluate the stock immediately. 
Part of the information the market reacts to is the information asymmetry and signaling 
related to an SEO. Information asymmetry is the basis of signaling effects. 
 
2.5.1 Information Asymmetry 
 
The pecking-order theory partly blames information asymmetry to be the reason why equity 
issues are viewed as a last resort financing source. The concept of information asymmetry 
origins from Akerlof (1970), which provided the first theoretical analysis of the problems 
arising when the quality of units in a market differ. This gives rise to moral hazard problems
5
, 
which cause adverse selection costs and an inefficient market price. Information asymmetry 
associated with SEOs suggests that investors require compensation for their lack of 
                                                          
4
 Different types of equity issues, including pure SEOs, private placements, rights issues, convertible debt, 
mergers, warrants, direct purchase plans, employee options, grants, and benefit plans. 
5
 Market participants trying to cheat the market, acting as they hold good quality products when they actually do 
not (Ogden et al., 2003). 
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information, leading to an undervaluation of the stock and hence makes an equity issue 
expensive for the corporation (Ogden et al., 2003).  
 
2.5.2 Signaling with SEOs 
 
Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signaling model anticipates that changes in management 
stockholdings in the firm cause changes in the market value of the stock. In line with the 
information asymmetry problems, investors assume that management is better informed about 
expected future cash flows, and that managers only hold large portions of firm equity if they 
believe the future cash flows will exceed historical and current cash flows. Therefore, rational 
investors view equity offerings to outside parties as credible negative signals of firm value 
(Leland & Pyle, 1977). This theory has also been empirically tested and supported by Downes 
and Heinkel (1982). 
 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory model touches upon the same subject as Leland 
and Pyle (1977). The agency theory model suggests that larger percentage shareholdings by 
managers decrease potential conflicts of interest between management and shareholders. 
More specifically, assuming that managers want to maximize their own wealth, their interests 
go in line with shareholders’ interests as well if managers own a large stake of corporate 
stock.    
Dobbin and Jung (1996) demonstrate another theory associated with agency problems. When 
managers’ interests are not aligned with shareholders’ interests (firm value maximization), 
managers may seek to execute value destroying growth activities, investing in negative net 
present value (NPV) projects. The reason for this behavior is that it would benefit 
management control, building large and complex “empires”. Investors’ awareness of this 
behavior causes a negative reaction of the announcement of an equity issue. 
 
Moreover, Miller and Rock (1985) propose that changes in external financing signals 
decreased current earnings. This theory is based on the presumption that investment decisions 
on average are consistent, and therefore this model concludes a stock price decrease 
proportional to the size of the announced equity offer.  
 
Furthermore, Myers and Majluf (1984) present the adverse selection model, which says that 
rational investors assume that managers accept equity issues only when they believe the stock 
12 
 
is overvalued. This is based on that management act upon the interest of shareholders, who 
benefit if additional equity is issued to outside investors when the stock is overvalued. That 
being said, this theory concludes that rational investors view equity offering announcements 
as a negative signal of firm value.  
 
To sum up, Leland and Pyle (1977), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Dobbin and Jung (1996), 
Miller and Rock (1985) and Myers and Majluf (1984) all conclude that raising additional 
equity to outside investors has a negative impact on rational investors’ view on firm value. 
Hence, the market value of the firm’s stock decreases. However, a number of studies 
containing contradictions to the above-mentioned theories have been conducted. McConell 
and Muscarella (1985) suggest that a negative market reaction may be partially offset if the 
firm simultaneously announces capital expenditure increases. Thus, the negative impact on 
market price by an equity issue announcement may be compensated for if the equity aims to 
be used for investment opportunities, including projects with positive NPV. Moreover, 
Cooney and Kalay (1993) say that an equity offer announcement may lead to both positive 
and negative market price reactions, depending on certain circumstances. Finally, Viswanath 
(1993) argues that the announcement of an equity issue does not always lead to a negative 
market reaction. Instead, Viswanath (1993) means that the price reaction to an SEO 
announcement is positively related to the most recent run-up in the market price of the stock
6
.  
 
2.6 Earlier Studies on SEO Announcement Effects 
 
Several event studies have been conducted to determine the announcement effects of seasonal 
equity offerings. Previous studies reveal that the market reacts negatively to a firm´s 
announcement of an equity offering, which is in line with the signaling theories in section 
2.5.2 Signaling with SEOs. More specifically, the average abnormal returns in the event 
window has ranged from -0.75 percent to -3.0 percent, depending on the study and sample 
(Ogden et al., 2003). 
 
Masulis and Korwar (1986) conducted an event study consisting of 1406 SEOs, announced 
over the period 1963-1980. The authors examined the announcement impact of SEOs on 
                                                          
6
 Viswanath (1993) defines that a run-up in the stock is if future NPV>0 projects exist. 
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publicly traded firms, and documented a statistically significant underperformance. The 
negative market reactions in this study are briefly explained by different signaling theories, 
e.g. the Myers and Majluf’s (1984) adverse selection model, Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency theory model and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signaling model. 
 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) is another study that measures the effect on stock prices after the 
announcement of 531 SEOs over the period 1963-1981. In this study, the stock market 
reaction to equity issue announcements is measured using daily excess stock returns. The 
authors found that the stock price decreases by approximately 3 percent following the 
announcement. Also, there is a significant negative relationship between size of the equity 
offering and abnormal returns (Asquith & Mullins, 1986). 
 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) observe the impact equity offerings have on stock price of 360 
firms during the time period 1972-1982. The changes in stock prices are measured using an 
event study. The authors document on average a negative statistically significant impact on 
stock price following the announcement of common stock and convertible debt offerings. 
Furthermore, the authors find results suggesting that the market reacts more negatively to 
offerings of common stock and convertible debt compared to offerings of straight debt. These 
findings are consistent and in line with Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory. 
 
Bayless and Chaplinksy (1996) use cumulative announcement date prediction errors for 
equity issuance to compare and measure the price reaction to SEO announcements, depending 
on if the issue is in high or low issuing volume periods. This method is used to be able to find 
out and explain if there is a window of opportunity for seasoned equity offerings. The results 
in this study indicate that the price reaction in periods of high equity issues volume are about 
200 basis points lower on average compared to low ditto. This result supports the existence of 
windows of opportunity because high equity volume issues periods are associated with lower 
levels of information asymmetry, due to the pecking order theory. Also, this suggests that 
firms may be able to decrease their equity issuance costs by doing equity offerings when there 
are periods of lower information asymmetry levels (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
 
Other studies that find negative effects on the stock price caused by equity offering 
announcements are Smith (1977), Logue and Jarrow (1978), and Marsh (1979). Also, Ritter 
(2003) describes an average announcement effect of -2 percent to an SEO. Moreover, there 
14 
 
are studies suggesting that the negative market effects to SEOs are not unique to the American 
market, e.g. Loderer and Zimmerman (1988) for rights offerings in Switzerland and Bøhren, 
Eckbo and Michalsen (1997) for rights offerings and standbys in Norway. Thus, these studies 
show that the negative announcement effects of SEOs are also supported by studies conducted 
with samples of firms in other countries than USA. 
 
Carlson et al. (2004) challenge previous studies that explain the negative average 
announcement effects with arguments based on constant mispricing. Instead, Carlson et al. 
(2004) use option theory to explain the negative average announcement effects of SEOs. 
Furthermore, this study is similar to Lucas and McDonald (1990), which argued for a theory 
based on pre price run-ups of SEO announcement effects. The main difference between these 
studies is that Lucas and McDonald (1990) focus on a risk neutral setting, while Carlson et al. 
(2004) use a risk aversion setting. Moreover, Carlson et al. (2004) argue that the firm’s 
historical financial conditions and corporate decisions leading to the equity offerings are the 
main reasons to a negative market reaction. Thus, the SEO itself is not the underlying factor 
of the negative market reaction. 
 
 
2.7 Earlier Studies on Long-Run Performance of SEOs 
 
Two of the first studies to analyze long-run performance of firms post equity offering were 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995). The latter study uses a 
sample of NYSE/Amex- and NASDAQ-listed firms that did an SEO during the time period 
1975-1989. The authors define long-run performance as Cumulative Abnormal Return 
(CAR), which is the average cumulative monthly return for the SEO firms that exceed the 
market return. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) present a CAR between -30.99 percent and -
39.36 percent five years after issuance, depending on the matching method used to measure 
market return
7
. Furthermore, the CAR-measures were positive the first month after the issue, 
but showed a continuous negative trend from the first month until year five. Also, the average 
cumulative raw return of the sample firms was positive during the five years following the 
issue, reaching a level of 45.9 percent in month 60. The positive average cumulative raw 
                                                          
7
 Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) use three different portfolios to represent normal return of non-issuing firms 
in the market. The portfolios used to match SEO performance with are size-matched firms, industry- and size-
matched firms, and book-to-market- and size-matched firms. 
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return means that the matching firms in total had an even higher positive average raw return. 
The results for average cumulative raw return and average CAR of Spiess and Affleck-
Graves’ (1995) 1247 observations can be seen below in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Spiess & Affleck-Graves (1995) average cumulative raw return and average CAR 
using three different matching methods 
 
Furthermore, Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) describe a possible interpretation to the SEO 
underperformance. That is, managers realize when the market is willing to overpay for the 
stock, and take advantage of this opportunity by timing their equity issues. Moreover, long-
run underperformance also suggests that the market does not correctly respond to the 
information initially after announcement. Thus, the initial reaction by the market causes a 
biased re-evaluation of the stock. Instead, investors wait for additional evidence or signals 
before they amend their view of firm value. Spiess and Affleck-Graves’ (1995) interpretation 
goes in line with the signaling theories in section 2.5.2 Signaling with SEOs, saying that an 
equity issue is a negative signal for firm value. However, the authors’ interpretation violates 
the efficient market hypothesis, since the market does not fully adjust for the information 
enclosed in the equity offer announcement.  
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Loughran and Ritter (1995) examine that both IPOs and SEOs underperform relative non-
issuing firms on the American stock exchanges during the time period 1970-1990. Firms 
doing SEOs have an average cumulative raw return of 7 percent
8
, while the matching non-
issuing firms have a 15 percent ditto, which suggests an 8 percent underperformance for the 
SEOs. Loughran and Ritter’s (1995) interpretation of their results goes in line with Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1995), suggesting that firms issue equity when the stock is overvalued. This 
interpretation is based on Myers and Majluf’s (1984) adverse selection model. 
  
Loughran and Ritter (1997) provide evidence that a post-issue decline in operating 
performance occur for SEO firms. Thus, operating measures such as profit margin and return 
on assets decrease during the period following the issue, which Loughran and Ritter (1997) 
link to the issuer’s poor stock performance. Moreover, Autore, Bray, and Peterson (2009) link 
stock performance to the intended use of funds generated by the issue. Debt repayment or 
general corporate purposes as intended use of proceeds on average lead to a substantial 
underperformance relative the market. On the other hand, issuers that communicate a specific 
investment purpose underperform to a smaller degree (Autore et al., 2009). 
 
However, Billet et al. (2011) critique the assumptions of long-run underperformance. The 
authors argue that long-run performance may be affected by other financial and operating 
decisions occurring after the event, which the majority of earlier studies do not take into 
account. Hence, the authors argue that underperformance may not be due to the SEO event 
itself. Furthermore, Billet et al. (2011) mean that firms returning to the external financing 
markets numerous times tend to underperform to a higher extent.  
 
2.8 Independent Variables Explaining Long-Run 
Performance of SEOs 
 
2.8.1 Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
Book-to-market ratio measures the market’s valuation of the corporation (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2011). Daniel and Titman (2006) measure the book-to-market ratio’s impact on long-run 
                                                          
8
 Equal to the average return of US T-bills during the same time period (Loughran & Ritter, 1995). 
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performance, and conclude that there is a positive relationship. This means that firms with 
higher book value of equity relative market value of equity tend to outperform firms with 
lower book value relative market value. However, Daniel and Titman (2006) suggest that 
there is no significance between past performance measures and future stock performance. 
Instead, the book-to-market effect on stock return is due to historical realization of intangible 
information. Thus, Daniel and Titman (2006) interpret the book-to-market ratio as a proxy for 
the market’s overvaluation of a firm’s intangible information. Similarly, Brav, Geczy, and 
Gompers (2000), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), and Loughran and Ritter (1995) present 
significant positive coefficients for book-to-market variables on long-run performance.  
 
2.8.2 Size (Market Capitalization) 
 
Intuitively, firm size impacts the return of stock. Therefore, Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) 
and Brav et al. (2000) use market capitalization as an independent variable for the firm’s size, 
trying to explain long-run performance. Both studies’ regressions result in a positive 
relationship between size and performance, implying that smaller firms tend to underperform 
more than larger firms. However, the same size variable in Loughran and Ritter (1995) is 
insignificant, suggesting there is no relationship between firm size and performance after 
SEO. 
 
2.8.3 Number of SEOs during Time Period 
 
Billet et al. (2011) find strong negative significance on their variable for number of financing 
events of the same firm. More specifically, the higher number of external financing events, 
the more the firm underperforms. This means that a firm’s long-run performance is dependent 
on the frequency of the firm’s issuance activities. Also, Loughran and Ritter (1995) measure 
the number of equity issues with a dummy variable (1 if the firm issues equity more than once 
during the past five years), and provide the same results, suggesting that firms issuing several 
times during a period of time perform worse. 
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2.9 Hypothesis Testing 
 
Based on covered theory and literature, the following null hypotheses for announcement 
effects, long-run performance, and the independent variables impact on long-run performance, 
have been formulated: 
  
Hypothesis for research question 1: 
H0: The official announcement of an SEO lead to a market reaction = 0 
H1: The official announcement of an SEO lead to a market reaction ≠ 0 
 
Hypothesis for research question 2: 
H0: Market adjusted long-run performance for SEOs = 0 
H1: Market adjusted long-run performance for SEOs ≠ 0 
 
Hypothesis for research question 3: 
H0: The coefficient for variable X
9
 = 0 
H1: The coefficient for variable X ≠ 0 
 
The results for each of the hypothesis testing are presented in section 4.2.2 Statistical 
Significance of Announcement Effects, 4.3.1 Statistical Significance of Long-Run 
Performance, and 4.4 OLS Regression, respectively.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
9
 Book-to-market ratio, market capitalization, and the firm’s number of SEOs during time period. 
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3 Methodology 
 
 
This chapter aims to explain the methodology used to answer the research questions. The 
chapter starts off describing the study’s research approach, strategy, data collection method, 
and sample selection. Thereafter, the measurements for announcement effects, long-run 
performance and independent variables are explained. Lastly, a critical methodological 
discussion is presented. 
 
3.1 Research Approach and Strategy 
 
The approach of this study is inspired by earlier studies within the area of firms’ performance 
after the announcement of SEO. That being said, the study takes on a deductive theory 
approach. According to Bryman and Bell (2011), a study follows deductive theory when the 
researcher deduces hypotheses on the basis on what is already known within the domain and 
on theoretical considerations related to that particular field of research. Furthermore, the 
hypotheses must include concepts translatable into the existing research entities. Finally, the 
hypotheses must be analyzed with empirics (Bryman & Bell, 2011). According to Bryman 
and Bell (2011), Figure 3.1 presents the step-by-step process using a deductive research 
approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: “The process of deduction” (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
1. Theory 
 
2. Hypotheses 
 
3. Data collection 
 
4. Findings 
 
5. Hypohteses confirmed or rejected 
 
6. Revision of theory 
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Moreover, this study uses a quantitative research strategy, which is natural since it takes on a 
deductive approach. A quantitative research strategy means that the study emphasizes 
quantification when gathering and analyzing data, along with employing measurements. Also, 
a quantitative strategy incorporates a natural scientific model and views the social reality as 
external and objective. (Bryman & Bell, 2011) 
 
Bryman and Bell (2011) compare the quantitative strategy to the alternative of using a 
qualitative strategy. The authors acknowledge four preoccupations that can be determined for 
a quantitative strategy, i.e. measurement, causality, generalization, and replication. 
 
 Measurement: Despite that measurements are an advantage of a quantitative strategy, it 
entails concerns regarding the validity and reliability of the study.  
 Causality: Quantitative researchers usually try to explain the causes and effects of 
results, using dependent and independent variables. When trying to explain results using 
a cross-sectional design, concerns about the variables’ simultaneous effects are raised. 
 Generalization: The concern regarding generalization of findings in quantitative studies 
is strong. In order to strengthen the ability and credibility of generalizing the results in 
this study, the authors conduct a comprehensive sample selection (Section 3.3), along 
with testing the statistical significance of the measures (section 3.4.1.4, section 3.4.2.2, 
and section 3.4.3). 
 Replication: For the study to be credible, biases and lack of objectiveness must be 
excluded from the results. More specifically, the researchers must make sure that the 
study can be replicated retaining the same results.  
 
The authors of this study are aware of the risks and possible weaknesses of conducting a 
quantitative study. More about these risks is presented in the methodological discussion in 
section 3.5.  
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3.2 Data Collection Method 
 
All data included in the study is manually collected from secondary sources, which is the 
most common data collection method for this type of study. The authors consider that data is 
of high quality, collected from reliable sources, which makes it a natural choice to use 
secondary data. 
  
The actual observations and official issuing dates are gathered from the website 
Nyemissioner.se, which is a leading source of information within SEOs on the Swedish stock 
exchanges. Furthermore, the exact date for all firms’ equity offering announcements are 
defined using the Retriever Research database, where SEO announcements communicated by 
reliable Swedish press
10
 are found. 
 
Quantitative data is mainly gathered from Thomson Reuters Datastream, which is an 
integrated application including global financial data. Data that is gathered from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream is adjusted stock prices (P
11
), index prices for OMXSPI (PI
12
), book-to-
market ratios (1/MTBV
13
), and market value (i.e. market capitalization) (MV
14
). Moreover, 
index prices for First North All-Share are gathered from NASDAQ OMX Nordic’s official 
website.  
 
Processing of data is exclusively completed in Excel, where part of the measurements and 
analysis of performance is done as well. Also, analytics software SPSS is used to analyze the 
firms’ performance further. Results for the regression, measuring the independent variables’ 
impact on long-run performance, along with diagnostic tests, are generated by econometrics 
software Eviews. 
 
  
                                                          
10
 Dagens Industri, Veckans Affärer, Affärsvärlden, GP, and Sydsvenskan are considered reliable sources. 
11
 Official closing price for stock. 
12
 Official closing price for index. 
13
 Market value of common equity divided by the balance sheet value of common equity. 1/MTBV equals book-
to-market ratio. 
14
 Share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in the company. 
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3.3 Sample Selection 
 
In this section, the sample selection, which is done prior to the collection of data, is presented. 
The sample selection has been categorized into time period, exchanges, corporations, and 
indices. 
 
3.3.1 Time Period 
 
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this study is to measure firms’ post-SEO performance in 
the recovery phase of the global financial crisis. Figure 3.2 below shows the index price of 
OMXSPI
15
 from January 2007 until March 2012, and it is generated in order to define the 
time period for recovery of the crisis in Sweden. The index price shows a negative trend from 
approximately July 2007 until January 2009. However, in January 2009 the negative trend is 
replaced by a positive trend the coming years. This hints that the recovery phase of the 
financial crisis in Sweden started in January 2009. Furthermore, the index price had not fully 
reached its pre-crisis levels at the end date March 31
st
 2012, hinting further that the recovery 
of the crisis was not finalized at the time. Naturally, the ending date of this study is set to 
March 31
st
 2012, to be able to measure long-run performance defined as the three-year stock 
return. Thus, the time period of this study is set to January 1
st
 2009 – March 31st 2012. This 
means that Swedish firms issuing equity within that interval are included in this study. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Historical index prices for OMXSPI. 
                                                          
15
 This study uses index price of OMXSPI as a proxy for the health of the Swedish economy. 
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3.3.2 Exchanges 
 
The two exchanges included in the study are NASDAQ OMX Stockholm and NASDAQ 
OMX First North. These two exchanges are selected because they cover firms on the Swedish 
stock markets, both operated by NASDAQ OMX Stockholm AB and owned by NASDAQ 
OMX Group (nasdaqomxnordic.com). Furthermore, the fact that the smaller firms listed on 
First North are less regulated than firms listed on OMX Stockholm, makes it interesting to 
compare the two in terms of markets reaction after SEO announcement. 
 
3.3.3 Corporations 
 
Out of all equity issuing corporations on the selected exchanges and during the selected time 
period, no specific sampling has been done. However, certain sample limitations have been 
defined, affecting the number of firms included in the measures for announcement effects and 
long-run performance, respectively.  
 
3.3.4 Sample Limitations for Announcement Effects 
 
In order to estimate a firm’s “normal” return in the estimation window, the study uses its 
stock’s historical daily return. If the firm has not been listed long enough prior to 
announcement, “normal” return cannot be estimated, and hence, these firms are excluded 
from the study. If data for a firm is not available for the whole estimation period, an 
individual estimation is performed in order to evaluate if there are enough observations of 
historical prices to generate robust results. However, the absolute minimum of observations of 
historical daily prices is 126 trading days (Benninga, 2008).  That being said, Forestlight 
Studio (Entertainment) AB (167 trading days) and Lightlab Sweden AB (222 trading days) 
are included in the study despite the lack of data for the whole estimation window. Also, firms 
announcing equity offerings, but cancel before the issue takes place, are excluded from the 
study.  
 
3.3.5 Sample Limitations for Long-Run Performance 
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Firstly, corporations being delisted during the three-year period following the equity issue are 
excluded from the study. Also, only the firm’s first equity offering during the time period is 
included in the study for long-run performance. Thus, if a firm returns to the equity market 
several times to issue additional equity, only the first SEO is included. Instead, this is 
measured in the regression. These sample limitations are in line with Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1995), which included only non-overlapping independent issues of firms during the 
time period.   
 
3.3.6 Index 
 
According to Benninga (2008), market indices as benchmarks should be broad-based and 
value-weighted, and origin from the same exchange as the sample firms. In order to fulfill 
these criteria, OMX SEK PI (OMXSPI) and First North All-Share SEK are chosen as 
benchmarks to represent market return for OMX Stockholm and First North, respectively.  
 
3.4 Data Analysis 
 
This section aims to explain the approach and measures used to analyze the research questions 
of the study. Firstly, the event study used to analyze announcement effect is explained. 
Thereafter, measures for long-run performance are presented, and lastly the cross-sectional 
regression, including diagnostic tests, is described. 
 
3.4.1 Event Study Measuring SEO Announcement Effects 
 
According to Benninga (2008), an event study may be used to determine if a particular event 
in the life of the company impacts its stock return. Briefly explained, an event study measures 
if the event causes abnormal return during the event window, and is calculated as the 
difference between actual return and expected return of the stock. Furthermore, the potential 
abnormal return is summed up during the event days, using the measure Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR), which measures the total effect of the event. 
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3.4.1.1 Estimation Window 
 
The estimation window is used to estimate a firm’s expected return. The estimation window 
usually consists of 252 trading days, in order to exclude seasonal effects on the corporation’s 
stock from its normal return (Benninga, 2008). Furthermore, the estimation model in this 
study goes in line with MacKinlay’s (1997) market model, which assumes a stable linear 
relationship between stock return and market return. In this study, index OMXSPI represents 
market return on OMX Stockholm, whereas index First North All-Share SEK represents 
market return on First North. Moreover, the time period of the estimation window is defined 
in line with MacKinlay (1997), using trading day -282 to -30 in relation to the event, 
generating 252 trading days in total. This time period is chosen mainly to avoid volatility in 
the stock return due to rumors and speculations about the event of equity offering. Such 
rumors and speculations may arise after invitation to an extraordinary general meeting 
(EGM), and are preferably excluded from the estimation window.   
 
3.4.1.2 Event Window 
 
The event window includes the event day, which according to Benninga (2008) is the date 
when the event becomes official to the public. However, the event window is normally an 
extended period around the event day to account for pre-event leakage and market reactions 
after the stock market closes on the event day (Benninga, 2008) and (MacKinlay, 1997). This 
study includes closing price for four trading days in the event window, where the 
announcement date is the second day. This, in turn, generates three event days including 
measures of stock returns. The two days post-announcement are included to adjust if the SEO 
is announced after the Swedish stock market has closed for the day, and to give the market 
time to reevaluate the stock (Masulis & Korwar, 1986) and (Bayless & Chaplinsky, 1996).  
 
3.4.1.3 Abnormal Return (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
 
The event study is created with inspiration from MacKinlay (1997). Firstly, a simple OLS-
regression is used to calculate the market model parameters
16
, and hence, to estimate expected 
return for the event days. The expected return for firm i event day t is calculated as follows:  
                                                          
16
 Expected return for stock as dependent variable, and market index return as independent variable. 
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E(rit) = Intercept(market model) + [ Slope(market model) * rmt ] 
 
Where: 
rmt = Actual return for index event day t. 
Furthermore, Abnormal Return (AR) for firm i event day t is calculated as follows: 
 
ARit = rit – E(rit) 
 
Where: 
rit = Actual return for firm i event day t. 
 
As the next step, Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for firm i event day t is calculated as 
follows: 
 
CARit = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡3
𝑡=𝑡1
 
 
Moreover, both the arithmetic mean and median for AR and CAR for all firms and event days 
are calculated. Also, standard deviation and variance both for the firms individually and 
combined are computed.  
 
3.4.1.4 Statistical Significance Tests 
 
In order to test and confirm/reject the hypothesis for announcement effect, the results need to 
be tested if statistically significant. Test statistics for average CAR event day three is 
calculated inspired by MacKinlay (1997) and is summarized below. 
 
Average ARt = 
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1  
Var(Average ARt) = 
1
𝑁2
∑ 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1  
Average CAR(t1, t2, t3) = ∑ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑡3
𝑡=𝑡1
 
Var(Average CAR(t1, t2, t3)) = ∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑡3
𝑡=𝑡1
) 
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Where: 
N = Number of firms. 
σ2εi = Standard deviation to the power of 2 (variance) for firm i. 
 
Moreover, using the variables above, test statistics (θ) is calculated as follows: 
 
𝜃 =  
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3))1/2
 ~ 𝑁(0,1) 
 
Test statistics is compared to critical values from the normal distribution table. Critical values 
are collected for the one, five, and ten percent significance levels.  
 
3.4.2 Long-Run Performance of SEOs  
 
The time period for long-run performance is generally defined as 3-5 years. This study 
measures three-year performance after equity issue and uses monthly historical prices from 
month 0 to month 36. Thus, this study uses event time T0 – T36, giving 36 observations for 
monthly return during the three-year period. Each monthly return in the study is generated by 
historical prices with 21 trading-days interval, which is in line with Loughran and Ritter 
(1995). 
 
3.4.2.1 Abnormal Return (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
 
The approach used to measure long-run performance is inspired by Spiess and Affleck-Graves 
(1995). Firstly, abnormal return is determined by taking the difference between monthly 
return for each firm and the return for related index the same time period. Thereafter, the 
arithmetic mean for abnormal return is calculated generating an average abnormal return 
including all firms. Lastly, the average abnormal returns for each month are added up in order 
to determine average Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR). The approach can be summed up 
using the following formulas, inspired by Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995): 
𝐴𝑅𝑡 = (
1
𝑛𝑡
) ∑(𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑂,𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑖𝑡)
𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1
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Where: 
ARt = Average abnormal return including all firms. 
nt = Number of firms. 
RSEO,it = Return for SEO firm i event month t. 
RIndex,it = Return for index the same time period. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
 
 
Where: 
CART = Average cumulative abnormal return month T. 
 
3.4.2.2 T-Test 
 
In order to confirm/reject the hypothesis for long-run performance, the results for average 
CAR month 36 need to be tested if statistically significant. According to Barber and Lyon 
(1997), a two-tailed t-test should be performed in order to statistically conclude long-run 
performance. Therefore, test statistics for the measure is calculated according to the following 
formula: 
 
𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅 =  
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝐴𝑅36
𝜎𝐶𝐴𝑅
√𝑛
⁄
 
Where: 
σCAR = Standard deviation. 
n = Number of observations. 
 
Test statistics is compared to critical values collected from the t-distribution table, using n-1 
degrees of freedom for the significance levels of one, five, and ten percent.  
 
3.4.3 Regression Analysis 
 
The third research question, “Did the mentioned variables have a significant effect on 
performance? If so, how did these independent variables impact performance?”, is answered 
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based on a multiple regression model. Similarly to Loughran and Ritter (1995), this study runs 
a cross-sectional regression in order to describe and evaluate the explanatory variables’ 
impact on the firms’ long-run performance. According to Brooks (2008), a cross-sectional 
regression is a type of regression in which the dependent and independent variables are 
associated with a single point in time. Furthermore, a multiple cross-sectional regression 
model allows having several independent variables in which each helps to explain, understand 
or predict the explained variable. The independent variables are tested at the one, five and ten 
percent significance levels since that is conventional (Brooks, 2008).  
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method is used in order to determine the coefficient 
estimates. The dependent variable is explained by intercept (α), coefficients (β) for the 
independent variables and the error term (u).  
 
CAR 36 =  α +  β1 ∗ (Book to Market Ratio) +  β2 ∗ LN(Market Cap) +  β3
∗ (Dummy for Several Offerings) +  u  
 
 
3.4.3.1 Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: 
CAR36: In the regression, the dependent variable is CAR for month 36, which is collected 
from the results of research question two. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅36 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
36
𝑡=0
 
 
Independent variables: 
The chosen independent variables are inspired by Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1995), Brav et al. (2000), Daniel and Titman (2006), and Billet et al. (2011), 
which variables were explained for in section 2.8 Independent Variables Explaining Long-
Run Performance of SEOs. The collection and measurement of each independent variable is 
explained below. 
 
Book-to-Market Ratio: This variable is calculated by dividing the book value of equity with 
the market value of equity. This study measures it by dividing 1 with the market-to-book-
value (MTBV) collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The book-to-market ratio is used 
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to find the value of a company by comparing the book value of a firm to its market value. It is 
used as a proxy for how investors value the company’s stock relative its book value. As 
Loughran and Ritter (1995), this study uses data from the 31st of December the year before 
the equity issue. 
  
Market Capitalization: Company size is a factor that could conceivably affect and correlate 
with abnormal return. Firm size may be defined as the market capitalization of a firm, which 
is the stock price multiplied with the number of shares outstanding. Furthermore, the market 
capitalization of each firm is collected by taking data at the 31st of December the year before 
the equity offering, which is in line with Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995). The natural 
logarithm of the variable is used in order to take into account for the risk of heteroskedasticity 
(Brooks, 2008). Also, this approach reduces the values of significant size, and thus, handles 
the potential problems caused by outliers.  
 
That being said, the independent variable for firm size included in the regression is:  
 
𝐿𝑁(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
 
Dummy Variable for Several Issues: A dummy variable is included in the regression since 
some firms are issuing equity more than once during the observed time period. The dummy 
variable takes on a value of 1 if the firm issued equity more than once throughout the time 
period, otherwise 0. The dummy variable is included in the same way as an independent 
variable in a cross-sectional regression (Brooks, 2008).  
 
3.4.3.2 OLS Regression 
 
OLS is according to Brooks (2008) the most common method used to estimate parameters’ 
impact on a dependent variable. OLS selects the slope coefficient and the intercept in order to 
minimize the vertical distances from the actual data observations to the fitted line. If the data 
fulfills the assumptions underlying the OLS model, it is viewed as the best linear unbiased 
estimator providing correct inferences (Brooks, 2008; Dougherty, 2011). Diagnostic tests are 
used to test whether these assumptions are fulfilled.  
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According to Brooks (2008), the five assumptions are as follows: 
1. The errors’ average value equals zero => E(ut) = 0. No need to test for this, since it is never 
violated when an intercept is included.  
2. The errors have a constant variance of overall values of independent variables => Var(ut)  
= σ2. This means that the residuals must be homoscedastic. Can be tested for using Breush-
Pagan-Godfrey (BPG) and/or White’s test for heteroskedasticity.  
3. The errors are statistically independent cross-sectionally => Cov(ui, uj) = 0. If not, there is 
an autocorrelation issue present. No need to test for autocorrelation for cross-sectional 
data, since it is not likely to occur and testing for it is complicated. 
4. No relationship between the error term and independent variable => Cov(ut, Xt) = 0. If not 
fulfilled, there is risk of endogeneity. More about this in section 3.5.6 Endogeneity 
Problem for Regression. 
5. The residuals are normally distributed => ut ~ N(0,σ
2
). A Jarque-Bera test can be run to 
check for normality of the residuals.  
 
Finally, two additional tests need to be performed for cross-sectional data to ensure that an 
OLS model is the most appropriate model. These tests are a correlation matrix to check for 
multicollinearity and a Ramsey RESET test to check for non-linearity (Brooks, 2008).  
 
3.4.3.3 Heteroskedasticity 
 
BPG and White’s test are two standard tests available to check for heteroskedasticity. White’s 
test is more general and the test is valuable because it makes few assumptions about the 
possible form of heteroskedasticity. BPG tests for a linear relationship between the residual 
variance and the independent variables. In other words, the tests use different approaches to 
conclude if the squared residuals from the OLS regression are related to the independent 
variables. The squared residuals are a proxy for the variance of the error terms, which under 
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity should be constant, and hence, have no relationship to 
the independent variables. In order to test this relationship, BPG and White’s test generate an 
F-test, a Chi-square test and a “scaled explained SS” test. If the null hypothesis is confirmed 
using the three statistical tests, data is homoscedastic. (Brooks, 2008)  
 
𝐻0: 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑖𝑠 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  
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3.4.3.4 Normal Distribution 
 
A Jarque-Bera test shows if the residuals are normally distributed with an expected value of 
zero and a variance of 𝜎2 (Brooks, 2008). The null hypothesis, that the residuals are normally 
distributed, is rejected if the p-value for the test is less than the chosen significance level.  
The following null hypothesis is formulated for the Jarque-Bera test:  
 
𝐻0: 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 
Brooks (2008) argues that if the residuals are not normally distributed, it may still be 
appropriate to practice OLS. This is because it is difficult to implement a model that does not 
make the assumption of normally distributed error terms. Also, if non-normal distribution 
exists in the regression, it will not lead to significant problems if the number of observations 
is sufficient in the regression (Brooks, 2008). 
 
3.4.3.5 Multicollinearity 
 
A correlation matrix tests how the independent variables are correlated with each other. 
According to Brooks (2008), it can be difficult to detect multicollinearity if the regression 
contains more than two explanatory variables. That being said, an accepted rule of thumb is 
that the correlation between two variables should not be outside the range of -0.7 - 0.7 
(Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
 
3.4.3.6 Non-Linearity 
 
Since OLS estimates a linear relationship between the dependent variable and independent 
variable(s), data need to be tested for non-linearity. According to Brooks (2008), Ramsey’s 
RESET test is a good indication if such signs exist. It should, however, be noted that the test 
is only designed to find quadratic and interactive non-linearity, and thus not detect other 
categories of non-linearity.  
The following null hypothesis is formulated for Ramsey’s RESET test:  
 
𝐻0: 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑖𝑠 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 
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3.4.3.7 Coefficient of Determination - R
2
 
 
The regression’s explanatory statement is read out by the coefficient “R-squared” or “R2”, and 
takes on a value between 0 and 1. The coefficient of determination explains how much of the 
total variation in data that is explained by the regression model (Brooks 2008).  
 
The formula for R
2
 is:  
 
𝐸𝑆𝑆
𝑇𝑆𝑆
 
 
Where:  
ESS = Explained sum of squares. 
TSS = Total sum of squares. 
 
Brooks (2008) criticizes R
2
 because explanatory power always increases when another 
independent variable is added to the regression. Furthermore, Brooks’ (2008) solution to the 
problem is instead to use the adjusted R
2
, of which takes into account the reduction in the 
number of degrees of freedom when a variable is added. Thus, the adjusted R
2
 can be 
considered a more appropriate measure for the coefficient of determination.  
 
3.4.3.8 F-Test 
 
According to Brooks (2008), an F-test can be used to test the null hypothesis that all 
coefficients, except the intercept, are equal to zero (i.e. β1 = 0, β2 = 0, ..., βk = 0, for k 
independent variables). If the p-value for the F-test is lower than the chosen significance 
level, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
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3.5 Methodological Discussion 
 
3.5.1 Reliability and Replication 
 
The term reliability refers to the issue whether the measures of the study are consistent. Also, 
it is closely related to the term replication, meaning that the study must be replicable by others 
in order to fulfill the criteria of reliability (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Furthermore, Bryman and 
Bell (2011) designate three factors that need to be considered when determining if the study is 
reliable, i.e. stability
17
, internal reliability
18
, and inter-observer reliability
19
. 
  
To achieve high reliability, the authors of this study have gathered data from reliable 
secondary sources. Nyemissioner.se, reliable Swedish business newspaper (e.g. Dagens 
Industri), the official website of NASDAQ OMX Nordic, and Thomson Reuters Datastream 
are all considered to contain correct information and data. Despite the reliability of chosen 
secondary sources, samples of data have been confirmed using a second source. Samples of 
official announcement dates have been confirmed by NASDAQ OMX Nordic’s official 
website. Also, samples of stock- and index prices have been confirmed by the same official 
website. In order for the study to be practically repeatable, all observations included in the 
study for announcement effects and long-run performance are listed in Appendix A and 
Appendix B, respectively. To sum up, the authors consider this study to be reliable and 
replicable, which is a presumption for the criteria of validity to be fulfilled. 
 
3.5.2 Validity 
 
Bryman and Bell (2011) describe validity as the concerns with integrity of the conclusions 
generated by the measures in the study. Furthermore, the concept of validity can be divided 
into measurement validity, internal validity and external validity. Measurement validity is 
fulfilled if the measures actually reflect the concepts that the study is supposed to examine. 
Moreover, internal validity concerns the causality mentioned in section 3.1 Research 
                                                          
17
 Results related to measures do not fluctuate over time. 
18
 All indicators associated to a result must be consistent. 
19
 Only an issue when subjective judgment is included in the results. 
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Approach and Strategy, while external validity refers to the generalization of the results, also 
mentioned in section 3.1 Research Approach and Strategy (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
 
The measures used in this study are the same as the measures used in earlier studies within 
SEO performance. Furthermore, conducting event studies and long-run performance studies 
using cumulative abnormal return are well known and generally accepted methodologies 
within the area of corporate finance. Also, concluding results testing its statistical significance 
contribute to increased validity of the study. That being said, the authors consider the study 
fulfilling the criteria of validity. Using other performance measures in addition to CAR would 
have increased validity of the study further. However, this has not been performed due to 
limitations in time.  
 
3.5.3 Secondary Data and Quantitative Method 
 
Bryman and Bell (2011) briefly describe criticism that quantitative research methods have 
been exposed to, mainly coming from researchers preferring a qualitative method. One key 
argument of criticism is that the natural scientific model of a quantitative method causes 
artificial precision and inaccuracy in the results, which cannot be related to society and 
“everyday life”. However, the basis of this study is data of stock prices and individuals’ 
market reactions to a real life event (SEO announcement). Therefore, the authors consider this 
study to contribute with a clear connection between research and reality.  
 
3.5.4 Announcement Effects 
 
As mentioned, this study uses the market model to estimate expected return of a stock. The 
market model is simple in design and the most commonly used method in event studies 
(Benninga, 2008). Also, it tends to generate robust results despite potential distribution 
problems in data (MacKinlay, 1997). However, there are several alternatives to the market 
model. MacKinlay (1997) mentions the constant mean return model
20
 as a main competitor to 
the market model. The constant mean model, however, does not take cyclicality of stock 
return into account. Considering potential cyclicality caused by the financial crisis, the 
authors of this study chose the market model, assuming it would generate a more precise 
                                                          
20
 The constant mean return model assumes a constant average stock return over time. 
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estimation. Furthermore, the authors are aware of that both models could have been tested, 
and compared by the coefficient of determination (R
2
) in order to conclude the most efficient 
model. Moreover, there are more advanced methods, where an economic method including 
certain statistical assumptions may be the most efficient way to estimate normal return 
(MacKinlay, 1997).  However, this has not been performed in this study due to limitations in 
time.  
 
Another present issue conducting an event study is inferences caused by uncertainty of the 
exact event date. MacKinlay (1997) argues that one cannot be certain if the market was 
informed of the event prior to closing time of the exchange at the event date. In this study, 
that potential problem has been handled by extending the event window.  
 
3.5.5 Long-Run Performance 
 
This study uses cumulative abnormal return to measure long-run performance. Another 
commonly used measure is market adjusted buy-and-hold return. Barber and Lyon (1997) 
define buy-and-hold return as an investment strategy where the investor buys the stock and 
then holds it over a certain period of time. Fama (1998) compares the benefits of the two 
measures, suggesting that buy-and-hold return reflects a more relevant investment strategy, 
while CAR takes continuous movements in stock prices into account. Furthermore, the two 
measures generate different results of long-run performance, particularly if the volatility is 
higher for the SEO firms than for indices (Barber & Lyon, 1997). Similarly to Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1995) and Brav et al. (2000), this study could preferable have measured both 
CAR and buy-and-hold return, which would have generated a broader analysis of long-run 
performance. 
 
Moreover, Brav et al. (2000) compare equally weighted abnormal return to value-weighted 
abnormal return. This study uses the equally weighted alternative, which assumes a strategy 
with equal investment in all SEO-firms’ stock. Value-weighted abnormal return, on the other 
hand, reflects investments proportional to the SEO firms’ market value at the time. The reason 
why this study measures equally weighted abnormal return, is that it gives a better picture in 
terms of mispricing in the markets (Brav et al., 2000). Also, this study takes the size 
perspective into account in the regression analysis.  
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3.5.5.1 Matching Method 
 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Brav et al. (2000) explain that the result of long-run 
performance is sensitive to what matching method the study uses. This study uses broad-
based market indices as its matching method to represent market return. An alternative 
matching method would be the use of reference portfolios, including firms of the same size as 
the SEO firms (Barber & Lyon, 1997). Furthermore, Barber & Lyon (1997) argue that the use 
of control firms as matching method is preferable over reference portfolios. This is based on 
that test statistics is biased when measuring CAR using reference portfolios as matching 
method. Thus, preferably this study could have used non-issuing control firms matching the 
SEO firms in terms of market capitalization, which goes in line with Loughran and Ritter 
(1995). However, one can argue that this method is more sensitive since the volatility in 
single control firms is usually higher than for broad-based market indices. Also, the SEO 
firms and control firms potentially differ significantly in terms of other variables than market 
capitalization, leading to biased results. All together, the authors of this study consider the 
matching method used being the most appropriate for this study, mainly due to mentioned 
arguments but also due to the time aspect of collecting data. 
 
3.5.6 Endogeneity Problem for Regression 
 
When running a regression, the possible risk of endogenous variables is always present. 
Endogeneity in data means that there is correlation between the independent variable(s) and 
the error term, which in turn results in biased and inconsistent parameters (Brooks, 2008). 
One main cause of endogeneity is omitted variables (Brooks, 2008). This means that 
endogeneity occurs because certain independent variables that should be included in the 
regression are left out. Instead, these particular independent variable(s) appear in the error 
term, and if they are correlated with any of the included independent variables, an 
endogeneity problem is a fact. Other main causes of endogeneity are simultaneity
21
, 
measurement error
22
, and selection bias
23
 (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Brooks, 2008). The 
authors of this study are aware of the risk of endogeneity, particularly due to omitted 
variables. To deal with the problem, chosen independent variables are inspired by and 
measured as in earlier studies. Furthermore, collecting historical values of independent 
                                                          
21
 The risk of simultaneous effects between dependent and independent variables. 
22
 Potentially arising when using proxies as dependent and/or independent variables. 
23
 Nonrandom assignment to treatment and control groups. 
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variables minimize the risk of simultaneity. Risks of measurement error and selection bias are 
not relevant for this study, due to the lack of proxy variables and treatment group, 
respectively. In summary, the potential risk of endogeneity is minimized in this study but 
cannot be completely eliminated.  
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4 Results 
 
 
In this chapter, the results and findings of the study are presented. Firstly, the number of 
observations are showed. Thereafter, results for announcement effects and long-run 
performance are presented and described. Lastly, the results for the regressions, including 
diagnostic tests, are presented. 
 
4.1 Number of Observations 
 
The number of observations is generated according to the sample selection and sample 
limitations in section 3.3 Sample Selection. Table 4.1 shows the number of observations for 
both time perspectives and both exchanges. Looking at the sample for announcement effect, 
the number of observations on each of the exchanges is almost equal (60 versus 63 
observations). The observations add up to a total of 123 observations for announcement 
effect. For long-run performance, on the other hand, there is a larger difference between 
observations for OMX Stockholm and for First North (45 versus 36, respectively). The 
change of proportions of observations between the two time perspectives is due to higher 
extent of delisted and excluded observations on First North (See section 3.3.5 Sample 
Limitations for Long-run Performance). In total there are 81 observations for long-Run 
performance.   
Table 4.1: Number of observations for both time perspectives and both exchanges 
Observations: Announcement Effect Long-Run Performance 
OMX Stockholm 60 45 
First North 63 36 
Total 123 81 
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4.2 SEO Announcement Effects 
 
This section presents results related to the announcement effects of SEOs on OMX 
Stockholm, First North, and for the two exchanges combined. 
 
4.2.1 SEO Announcement Effects during Event Window 
 
Figure 4.1 below shows the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for event day 1 to 3, 
generated by the event study. This is shown for both exchanges separately.  As can be seen in 
the figure, both average and median CAR for OMX Stockholm are negative during the whole 
event window, ending up with an average CAR of -3.82 percent and a median CAR of -3.90 
percent event day 3. This suggests that firms listed on OMX Stockholm underperformed 
during the announcement of equity offering, compared to their normal historical stock return. 
Moreover, the median CAR for First North is also negative during the whole event window, 
with a CAR event day 3 of -1.31 percent. However, the average CAR for First North is 
positive (5.41 percent) event day 3, which is due to a positive average abnormal return (AR) 
of 11.24 percent event day 2. The difference between average and median CAR makes the 
performance of SEOs on First North more complex to analyze than for OMX Stockholm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Average and Median CAR for OMX Stockholm and First North separately. 
 
Using the observations for both exchanges, Figure 4.2 presents the average CAR for both 
exchanges combined. The average CAR is 0.91 percent event day 3, while median CAR is -
2.94 percent the same event day. Again, the positive average CAR is mainly due to the 
positive average AR event day 2 for First North. 
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Figure 4.2: Average and Median CAR for both exchanges combined. 
 
Intuitively, the positive average AR event day 2 for First North is, according to earlier studies, 
a bit surprising. In order to analyze it further, a boxplot for AR event day 2 is created and 
presented below in Figure 4.3. The boxplot shows that there is a significant outlier 
(observation ”123” Arctic Gold AB in the boxplot), with an AR of 805 percent. This can be 
compared to the median AR of -0.78 percent, which is showed in the boxplot as well. Thus, 
Arctic Gold AB is a key explanation to the positive average AR event day 2. Also, the boxplot 
shows that the positive outliers, particularly Arctic Gold AB, exceed the negative outliers, 
which is a reason why average CAR is higher than median CAR. Boxplots for event day 1 
and 3 are attached in Appendix C.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Boxplot for both exchanges combined, AR event day 2. 
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Table 4.2 sums up the results for average CAR by breaking it down to descriptive statistics for 
all three event days. What stands out in the table is, except from the maximum of 8.05 (Arctic 
Gold AB) for event day 2, the standard deviations. For event day 1 and 3, the standard 
deviation is 0.18 and 0.12, respectively. For event day 2, the standard deviation is 0.74, which 
is significantly higher than for the other two days. The relatively higher standard deviation for 
event day 2 is a natural consequence of the significant maximum value. 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for average AR, all event days separately. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
AR Event Day 1 123 -0.93 0.88 -0.044 0.18 
AR Event Day 2 123 -0.50 8.05 0.05 0.74 
AR Event Day 3 123 -0.57 0.94 0.0025 0.12 
Valid N (listwise) 123     
 
 
Figure 4.4 below shows the average and median CAR year-by-year depending on what year 
the firm announced its equity offering. Firstly, it can be seen that Arctic Gold AB announced 
its SEO in 2010, leading to the relatively high average CAR that year. Except from average 
CAR 2010, all other years show a negative average and median CAR. Lowest median CAR 
was for 2010 (-3.59 percent), while the lowest average CAR was for 2011 (-5.85 percent). 
What should be added is that according to section 3.3.1 Time Period, the year of 2012 only 
includes observations that announced an equity issue before April 1
st
. The year-by-year 
average and median CAR for both exchanges separately are presented in Appendix D. 
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Figure 4.4: Average and median CAR presented year-by-year when the SEO was done 
 
 
4.2.2 Statistical Significance of Announcement Effects 
 
This far, only economic under- or over performance during the event window has been 
measured. The following section includes measures to conclude if SEO performance is 
statistically significant. Table 4.3 presents the statistical significance of all individual 
abnormal returns for every firm. Therefore, there are a total 369 observations, including AR 
for each of the three event days for all 123 corporations. In total, there are 61 negatively 
significant AR and 36 positively significant AR, and hence, 272 insignificant observations. 
Out of the 61 negatively significant observations, 32 are from OMX Stockholm and 29 from 
First North. 
 
Table 4.3: Statistic significance of Abnormal Return.  
Significant AR OMX Stockholm First North Total 
Total AR Observations 180 189 369 
Positively Significant 16 20 36 
Negatively Significant 32 29 61 
Not Significant 132 140 272 
 
 
Finally, Table 4.4 presents the statistical significance for CAR event day 3. Test statistics are 
calculated using the mean, median, and mean excluding Arctic Gold AB, respectively. 
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Furthermore, test statistics is compared to critical values for the one, five and ten percent 
significance levels, assuming normal distribution. If the sample is insignificant, the results 
cannot be statistically differed from zero. As showed in the table, test statistics for the 
sample’s “mean” is insignificant, while “median” is negatively significant on ten percent 
level, and “mean excluding Arctic Gold AB” is negatively significant on five percent level. 
The variables used to calculate all three test statistics are presented in Appendix E.  
 
Table 4.4: Statistic significance for CAR event day 3. 
Test Statistics (Mean) 0.55 Not Significant 
Test Stats (Median) -1.79 Significant * 
Test Stats (Mean) w/o Arctic Gold AB -2.36 Significant ** 
Critical Values:   
1% +/- 2.575  *** 
5% +/- 1.98  ** 
10% +/- 1.645  * 
 
 
4.3 Long-Run Performance of SEOs 
 
This section presents results related to long-run performance of SEOs on OMX Stockholm, 
First North, and for the two exchanges combined. 
 
Figure 4.5 below shows the average cumulative raw return and average CAR for both 
exchanges separately through the three-year period (36 months). Average cumulative raw 
return for SEOs listed on OMX Stockholm is positive until month 18, then it turns negative 
month 19 and ends up at –12.1 percent month 36. The average cumulative raw return for 
SEOs listed on First North is more volatile. It is positive during month 1, 3-9, and 30, while it 
is negative the rest of the time during the 36-months period. Noticeable is the occurrence of a 
substantial increase in average raw return month 29, which impacts the average cumulative 
raw return significantly. Average cumulative raw return for SEOs on First North ends up at -
11.1 percent after 36 months. To sum up, both exchanges end up at a negative cumulative raw 
return after 36 months, where the returns of the First North observations are more volatile 
during the time period than those for OMX Stockholm.  
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Moreover, Figure 4.5 shows average CAR for both exchanges separately. OMX Stockholm’s 
average CAR increases from month 2 to 5, followed by a negative trend during the rest of the 
time period. Average CAR for SEOs on OMX Stockholm ends up at –38.20 percent. Average 
CAR for First North is, just as its average cumulative raw return, more volatile than OMX 
Stockholm’s ditto. It shows a negative trend from month 7 to month 27. However, the 
substantial increase in average raw return month 29 impacts the average CAR curve as well. 
Average CAR for First North ends up at –10.50 percent month 36.  
 
Summarizing all four curves, it can be concluded that average cumulative raw return for the 
two exchanges end up at approximately the same level after 36 months. Observe that SEOs on 
both exchanges show a three-year negative average cumulative raw return. Average CAR, on 
the other hand, is lower for OMX Stockholm than for First North month 36, suggesting that 
SEOs on OMX Stockholm underperform to a higher degree relative the market than SEOs on 
First North do. Taking the similar level of raw returns into account, it can be concluded that 
the higher underperformance on OMX Stockholm is due to higher returns for the OMXSPI 
index than for the First North All-share index. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Raw return and CAR for OMX Stockholm and First North separately.  
 
Figure 4.6 below presents average cumulative raw return and average CAR for both 
exchanges combined. Noticeable is that both curves follow each other, showing the same 
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trends, during the whole time period. The average CAR curve shows a negative trend 
approximately from month 7 to 24, and again from month 30 to 36. The fact that the curves 
follow each other means that indices perform an approximately constant higher return than 
SEO firms during the time period. Average cumulative raw return ends up at –11.63 percent 
month 36, while average CAR ends up at –25.90 percent month 36. Values for average raw 
return and average CAR month 1 through month 36 are presented in Appendix F. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Raw return and CAR for both exchanges combined 
 
Table 4.5 below shows descriptive statistics of average CAR for the 81 observations at month 
36. The minimum value of -3.76 belongs to RusForest AB. The maximum value of 11.36 
belongs to Cassandra Oil AB, which according to the boxplot presented in Appendix G, is the 
only outlier in the sample. This suggests that Cassandra Oil AB is a key reason why the 
standard deviation of average CAR month 36 is relatively high.  Both RusForest AB and 
Cassandra Oil AB are listed on First North.  
 
Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics for CAR month 36, both exchanges combined. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CAR Month 36 81 -3.76 11.36 -0.2588 1.84472 
Valid N (listwise) 81     
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4.3.1 Statistical Significance of Long-Run Performance 
 
Lastly, Table 4.6 presents the statistical (in)significance for average CAR month 36. Test 
statistics is calculated using a t-test with 80 (81 observations minus 1) degrees of freedom. 
The results for First North and both exchanges combined cannot be statistically differed from 
zero. However, average CAR for SEO firms listed on OMX Stockholm is statistically 
significant on 5 percent level. The variables used to calculate test statistics are presented in 
Appendix G. 
 
Table 4.6: Statistic significance for CAR month 36. 
Test Statistics:   
OMX Stockholm -2.04 ** 
First North -0.27 Not Significant 
Both Exchanges Combined -1.27 Not Significant 
Critical Values:   
1% +/- 2.64  *** 
5% +/- 1.99  ** 
10% +/- 1.66  * 
 
 
4.4 OLS Regression 
 
Firstly, a regression with CAR month 36 for all observations from both exchanges as 
dependent variable was run. The diagnostic tests conclude that an OLS regression fits the 
data
24
. However, all three independent variables are statistically insignificant, which means 
that the coefficients cannot be differed from zero. The results for the OLS regression 
including all observation and related diagnostic tests are presented in Appendix H.  
 
As mentioned, Table 4.6 shows that average CAR month 36 for the observations listed on 
OMX Stockholm is negative and statistically significant, which is in line with earlier research. 
That being said, a regression with CAR month 36 for OMX Stockholm as dependent variable 
may be considered more interesting to analyze and compare to results of earlier studies. 
                                                          
24
 However, it can be argued for that non-normality is an issue. 
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Therefore, the following regression results, including diagnostic tests, are for SEO-firms 
listed on OMX Stockholm.   
 
Table 4.7 below shows the results from the OLS regression with CAR month 36 for SEO 
firms listed on OMX Stockholm as dependent variable. The coefficients show how the 
independent variables impact the dependent variable economically. Thereafter, the 
coefficients, along with standard errors and t-statistics are used to generate the p-values. The 
p-value for a variable is what determines if the coefficient is statistically significant, and 
hence can be statistically differed from zero. 
 
As can be seen in Table 4.7 the book-to-market ratio has a coefficient of 0.015. This means 
that a one-unit increase in book-to-market ratio would increase CAR month 36 by 0.015.  
One may argue that a 0.1-unit increase in book-to-market ratio is more relevant to analyze, 
which would increase CAR month 36 by 0.0015. However, looking at the p-value suggests 
that this variable is statistically insignificant. Thus, the impact of a firm’s book-to-market 
ratio on its CAR month 36 cannot be differed from zero.  
 
Moreover, the natural logarithm of market capitalization (LN (Market Cap)) has a coefficient 
of 0.105. This means that a one-unit (1 million SEK) increase in market capitalization 
increases CAR month 36 by 0.001. The actual impact of this variable is calculated by the 
following formula: 
 
0.105292 * ln(1.01) = 0.001047… 
 
However, the variable for market capitalization is also statistically insignificant, meaning its 
coefficient cannot be differed from zero. 
 
The last independent variable, the dummy variable for several offerings shows a coefficient of 
-0.964. Also, its p-value suggests that the coefficient is statistically significant on five percent 
level. Thus, if firms return to the equity markets to issue equity more than once during the 
time period, this affects its CAR month 36 by -0.964.  
 
Furthermore, Adjusted R-squared suggests that 8.1 percent of the total variation in data is 
explained by this regression, when degrees of freedom are taken into account. Lastly, the F-
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statistic and its p-value conclude if the null hypothesis (that is, all coefficients in the 
regression, except the intercept, are equal to zero) should be confirmed or rejected. This null 
hypothesis is rejected on ten percent significance level. Values for dependent and independent 
variables are presented in Appendix B.  
 
Table 4.7: Regression Results with CAR Month 36 for OMX Stockholm as dependent variable. 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-Statistics P-Value 
Intercept (C) -0.878 0.719 -1.22 0.23 
Book-to-Market Ratio 0.015 0.182 0.084 0.93 
LN(Market Cap) 0.105 0.093 1.13 0.27 
Dummy Several Offerings -0.964 0.425 -2.27 0.029** 
R-Squared 0.144 F-Statistic 2.30 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.081 Prob(F-Stats) 0.092* 
Comment: ** = p<0.05 ; * = p<0.1 
 
4.4.1 Diagnostic Tests 
 
The diagnostic tests conclude that the OLS assumptions are not violated and that the model is 
appropriate to use. Results for each test for heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity, normal 
distribution, and non-linearity are summarized below. The specific test results are showed in 
Appendix I. 
 
4.4.1.1 Heteroskedasticity 
 
The results from both Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey’s test and White’s test show insignificant p-
values. The Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test presents p-values of 0.64, 0.62, and 0.58 for the F-
test, chi-squared test, and “scaled explained SS” test, respectively. The same p-values for 
White’s test are 0.92, 0.89, and 0.86. In summary, this means that both tests confirm the null 
hypothesis, suggesting that data is homoscedastic. Thus, there is no present heteroskedasticity 
problem.   
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4.4.1.2 Normal Distribution 
 
The Jarque-Bera test for each of the variables show that CAR month 36 and LN (Market Cap) 
are normally distributed. However, book-to-market ratio and the dummy variable are not 
normally distributed.  Furthermore, the histogram shows that the combined Jarque-Bera test 
has a p-value of 0.037, which suggests that the null hypothesis of normal distribution is 
rejected on 5 percent level but confirmed on 1 percent level. The ambiguous results for the 
Jarque-Bera tests, along with the lack of alternative models not assuming normal distribution, 
leads to that the potential problem of non-normality is ignored. 
 
4.4.1.3 Multicollinearity 
 
The correlation matrix presents results for correlation between all independent variables. The 
highest correlated independent variables are book-to-market ratio and the dummy variable for 
several offerings (-0.08), with a p-value of 0.61. This means that there is no signs of 
multicollinearity between any of the independent variables.  
 
4.4.1.4 Non-Linearity 
 
Ramsey’s RESET test shows that F-statistics and “FITTED^2” have a p-value of 0.84, and 
that the chi square test has a p-value of 0.83. Thus, the null hypothesis of linearity is 
confirmed. These results suggest that a linear model such as OLS, should be used to estimate 
the parameters.  
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5 Analysis and Discussion 
 
 
This chapter aims to analyze the results generated in chapter 4, and compare these results to 
earlier research and theories. Also, a discussion is presented based on the analysis. The 
discussion explains certain premises and other factors that potentially impact the results. 
 
5.1 SEO Announcement Effects 
 
“Did the official announcement of an SEO lead to a negative market reaction?" 
 
When including all observations on both exchanges, and using the arithmetic mean 
calculating test statistics, one cannot conclude a negative market reaction to SEO 
announcements. However, analyzing the data further, Figure 4.3 and Table 4.2 show that one 
particular outlier, Arctic Gold AB
25
, has a significant impact on the results. This is due to its 
positive abnormal return event day 2, which also affects the variance of the sample 
substantially. Excluding Arctic Gold AB from the sample, a statistical negative market 
reaction can be concluded on five percent significance level. Furthermore, Figure 4.4 shows 
that no particular trend in underperformance can be seen throughout the years 2009-2012. To 
sum up the results of the first research question, excluding Arctic Gold AB from the sample, 
the official announcement of an SEO did lead to a negative market reaction. One can argue 
that this negative market reaction cannot be associated to a certain year or stock exchange, but 
rather to both exchanges during the time period 2009-2012 as a whole.  
 
5.1.1 Results Compared to Earlier Studies and Theory 
 
As can be seen in Appendix E, the average cumulative abnormal return is -5.67 percent event 
day 3 (excluding Arctic Gold AB). This can be compared to earlier studies, where average 
abnormal returns in the event window varies from -0.75 percent to -3.0 percent (Ogden et al., 
2003). Thus, the results of this study show a more negative average market reaction than what 
                                                          
25 Arctic Gold AB is listed on First North. 
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Ogden et al. (2003) describe that earlier studies have showed. Thus, it can be argued for that 
an SEO announcement in Sweden during the recovery phase of the financial crisis leads to a 
more negative announcement effect than for SEO firms on the American stock markets during 
other time periods. 
 
Overall, this study shows no signs of more negative market reaction during a specific year in 
the time period. This hints that during the recovery phase of the financial crisis, there were no 
specific windows of opportunity in the equity markets that firms have taken advantage of. 
Thus, the results of this study go against Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), which say that there 
are high volumes issuing periods causing windows of opportunities for firms to impose on.  
 
Naturally, the results of this study confirm theories suggesting that issuing additional equity to 
outside investors has a negative impact on the market’s view on firm value. Several theories 
base this assumption on information asymmetry, including signaling of equity offerings 
suggesting that managers have poor confidence in the company’s future operating 
performance and/or them believing that the stock is overvalued. Also, an equity offering may 
be associated with agency problems, where managers’ interests are not aligned with 
shareholders’ interests. This study cannot specifically conclude which of these theories are 
relatable to Swedish SEO firms, but concludes that they may be appropriate to look further 
into if the results were to be analyzed further. Moreover, the overall negative announcement 
effect on the firms’ market value supports the pecking order theory, saying that pure equity 
financing is a last resort financing source.   
 
It is also important to analyze the results in terms of theories going against the traditional 
signaling theories saying that equity issues lead to negative market reactions. McConell and 
Muscarella (1985), Cooney and Kalay (1993), and Viswanath (1993) all suggest that equity 
offerings may lead to positive market reactions. As can be seen in Table 4.3, 36 of the 
observations for abnormal return (AR) are positively significant, which hints that the results 
partly go in line with mentioned contradicting theories. Positively significant abnormal return, 
such as Arctic Gold AB event day 2, may be caused by simultaneous positive information to 
potential investors. Similarly to what McConell and Muscarella (1985) suggest, positive 
information possibly includes announcements of capital expenditure, increasing the investors’ 
confidence in the firm. Moreover, the fact that Table 4.3 shows both negatively and positively 
significant observations for AR supports the tradeoff theory, suggesting that firms aim for an 
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optimal capital structure. Assuming rational investors, a positive market reaction to an equity 
announcement would be when the firm’s financial distress costs exceed the tax advantages of 
debt. Thus, different results of this study possibly support the pecking order theory and the 
tradeoff theory, respectively.  That being said, this study does not aim to challenge either of 
these capital structure theories, but rather to raise the question for further research. 
 
5.2 Long-Run Performance of SEOs 
 
“Did SEO firms underperform in a three-year perspective 
 following the last issuing date?” 
 
As seen in Table 4.6, when including observations on both exchanges, CAR month 36 is 
economically negative, but a statistical long-run underperformance cannot be concluded. 
However, outliers particularly coming from First North cause a relatively high variance, 
which is the reason to the insignificant results. This argument is further confirmed looking at 
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6. These diagrams show a negative average cumulative raw return 
month 36 for samples on both exchanges. This concludes that investors would have been 
better off investing in risk-free assets during the period, which along with a positive raw 
return for the two indices speak for an underperformance of SEO firms on both exchanges. 
Also, looking at only OMX Stockholm, there is a statistical long-run underperformance for 
SEO firms, relative index OMXSPI. To sum up, the negative CAR month 36 for OMX 
Stockholm is statistically significant, and the samples on both exchanges have a negative 
average raw return. This speaks for that SEO firms did underperform during a three-year 
perspective following the last issuing date.  
 
5.2.1 Results Compared to Earlier Studies and Theory 
 
Similarly to Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) and Loughran and Ritter (1995), the results of 
this study
26
 conclude long-run underperformance for SEO firms in on OMX Stockholm in the 
recovery phase of the financial crisis. One main difference, however, is that the SEO firms in 
the mentioned earlier studies generate a positive average raw return, while the SEO firms in 
this study generate a negative ditto.  Furthermore, a comparison between Figure 1 and Figure 
                                                          
26
 Note: As mentioned, only long-run underperformance on OMX Stockholm is statistically significant. 
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4.6 shows that the results of this study are in line with Spiess and Affleck-Graves’ (1995) in 
terms of an initial increase in CAR, followed by a negative trend leading to an overall long-
run underperformance.  
 
The results of this study are aligned with the interpretations of Spiess and Affleck-Graves 
(1995 and Loughran and Ritter (1995). The results suggest that, despite the negative 
announcement effect described in research question 1, the market does not fully adjust to the 
information contained in the equity offering announcement. Instead, the initial re-evaluation 
of the stock by the market is biased, which is a potential reason to the long-run 
underperformance. This interpretation challenges the efficient market hypothesis, and hence, 
suggests that the Swedish stock markets are inefficient in terms of market reaction to SEO 
announcements. One possible explanation to inefficiency is illiquidity in the market, which 
causes a delay in market reactions. However, this argument is challenged by the fact that test 
statistics for OMX Stockholm is statistically significant, while test statistics for First North is 
insignificant. More specifically, the illiquidity argument does not hold completely since the 
generally less traded stocks on First North statistically perform better during the time period, 
relative the market. 
 
Moreover, it should be mentioned that the matching method differs between Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1995)
27
, Loughran and Ritter (1995)
28
 and this study. As mentioned in 
section 3.5.5.1 Matching Method, the results of long-run performance is sensitive to what 
specific matching method that is used, and this may have a significant impact on the 
differences in results. 
 
  
                                                          
27
 Use of portfolios only including non-issuing firms, matching SEO firms by different variables. 
28
 Use of control firms matching SEO firms by firm size. 
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5.3 Independent Variables Impacting Long-Run 
Performance of SEOs 
 
“Did the mentioned independent variables have a significant effect on performance?  
If so, how did these independent variables impact performance?” 
 
This section aims to explain the potential impact the independent variables have on SEO 
firms’ long-run performance. The analysis uses the results from Table 4.7 and compares to 
earlier studies and theory. 
 
5.3.1 Book-to-Market Ratio 
 
The variable book-to-market ratio has a positive coefficient of 0.015 for OMX Stockholm, but 
it is statistically insignificant. The positive coefficient goes in line with Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1995), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Brav et al. (2000), and Daniel and Titman (2006), 
but these studies’ coefficients for book-to-market are statistically significant.  
 
Similarly to Titman and Daniel (2006), one may say that the lower book-to-market ratio, the 
more overvalued the firm’s stock is. That being said, the positive coefficient goes in line with 
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) adverse selection model. More specifically, managers have a 
tendency to issue additional equity when the firm’s stock is overvalued, which leads to a 
negative market reaction when rational investors are aware of this potential behavior. If the 
book-to-market ratio is relatively high, rational investors assume that the underlying reason 
for SEO is not that managers want to take advantage of an overvalued stock, and hence, the 
long-run market reaction is not as negative as if the book-to-market ratio was lower. 
However, since the coefficient is not significant, the argument of overvaluation cannot be 
confirmed. Instead, one can argue for that the insignificant book-to-market value goes in line 
with EHM, assuming that the market value of a stock always reflects its true value. Therefore, 
current overvaluation by the market does not occur, and book-to-market ratio has no impact 
on future stock return.  
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5.3.2 Size (Market Capitalization) 
 
LN (Market Cap) shows a positive coefficient of 0.105 for OMX Stockholm, but the p-value 
shows that the coefficient is statistically insignificant. This result goes completely in line with 
Loughran and Ritter (1995), which also concluded statistical insignificance for their variable 
of market capitalization.  
 
Intuitively, a positive significant coefficient would make sense. That is, larger firms are 
generally more well-known and traded more frequently. This would lead to an unbiased initial 
adjustment of the stock price at announcement, and thus, better long-run performance. 
However, this theory cannot be confirmed due to the insignificant coefficient.  
 
5.3.3 Number of SEOs during Time Period 
 
The coefficient for the dummy variable is -0.964, and statistically significant for OMX 
Stockholm. This result goes in line with Billet et al. (2011) and Loughran and Ritter (1995). 
Several equity issues during the time period may signal that the firm is desperate for external 
equity, possibly due to unavailability of internal funds and debt, and goes in line with the 
pecking order theory. Naturally, the signaling caused by several equity lead to continuous 
negative market reactions during the time period. Possibly, several offerings also show 
management incompetence, not being able to invest issued equity in positive NPV project(s) 
generating internal funds. Instead, the firm needs to return to the equity markets to issue more 
external funds.  
 
  
57 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
This study shows results for the Swedish stock markets during the recovery phase of the 
financial crisis, including observations according to sample selections in section 3.3. 
However, it is important to discuss how the results of the study may have differed with other 
premises.  
Firstly, the study includes firms that use different approaches to issue seasoned equity. More 
specifically, both firms providing priority to current shareholders, and firms that do not 
provide that type of priority, are included. Focusing on one or the other, or adjusting for 
differences between the two in the results possibly would have changed the findings. 
Similarly to Masulis and Korwar (1986), this study could have excluded all observations 
showing signs of being rights offers. Also, focusing on observations within a range of offering 
size, similarly to Asquith and Mullins (1986), may have targeted the results further. However, 
one must keep in mind that the Swedish market for SEOs is significantly smaller than in 
USA, which possibly would have made the data collection for these alternative approaches 
difficult to accomplish. 
 
Furthermore, measuring long-run performance, this study excludes delisted corporations 
completely. One key reason to delisting is poor stock performance, and the possibility that the 
firm filed for bankruptcy. That being said, one may argue for that the results of the sample’s 
average abnormal returns are positively biased due to exclusion of delisted companies. More 
advanced databases, along with adjusting the methodology, arguable could have solved the 
problem of delisting. However, due to time and cost restrictions, this study could not go 
through with that solution.  
 
On the other hand, there are possible adjustments that potentially would have increased the 
abnormal returns of the SEO firms. As in Brav et al. (2000), abnormal returns may have been 
higher if value-weighted abnormal return was measured. As mentioned, this study gives all 
firms the same percentage impact on average return, while using a value-weighted portfolio 
would have given larger firms a higher percentage impact on AR, and hence, improved the 
results of SEO firms’ returns.  However, the insignificant coefficient for market capitalization 
in the regression speaks against this argument.  
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Carlson’s et al. (2004) arguments that financial conditions prior to the offering is the 
underlying reason for the negative announcement effect, are to some extent not applicable on 
this study. By measuring a firm’s expected return in the estimation window prior to the 
announcement, historical financial conditions are taken into account. Thus, if firms perform 
worse in the event window relative their own historical performance, a negative abnormal 
return caused by the actual SEO event can be concluded. However, this study does not 
examine if long-run underperformance possibly is due to historical financial performance or 
financial decisions after the equity offering, which Billet et al. (2011) suggest should be taken 
into account. 
   
Moreover, the consequences of relatively low interest rates during the time period are one 
potential explanation to the poor long-run performance of SEO firms after the financial crisis. 
During the recovery phase of the crisis, interest rates have been set relatively low in order to 
boost investments and decrease savings in risk-free assets. However, as Vigna (2014) flagged 
for, the recovery phase of the crisis was characterized by decreased investor confidence, 
causing the demand for risky investments to go down. Therefore, one may argue for that low 
interest rates, along with lower demand for risky investments instead boosted demand for 
lower-risk stock. Thus, investors’ risk appetite suited stock with low betas but with higher risk 
and expected return than risk-free assets. That being said, the demand and price of risky SEO 
firms may have decreased, while the demand and price for less risky firms included in indices 
OMXSPI and First North All-share increased. Hence, this explanation possibly caused the 
average negative raw return and negative average abnormal return of SEO firms.  
 
Lastly, the occurrence of the global financial crisis may have taught investors that over 
optimism in the markets normally is the underlying reason of crises. The over optimism, 
which generally causes an increase of prices in the stock markets eventually backfires and 
causes a loss for investors. Therefore, investors may avoid over optimism in risky securities, 
such as SEO firms, which decreases the demand and price of these firms’ stock. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
 
This ending chapter aims to conclude the research questions. Also, this chapter covers 
potential future research that the authors recommend. 
 
This study has examined announcement effects and long-run performance of SEO firms in the 
Swedish stock markets, during the recovery phase of the global financial crisis. The 
consequences of the crisis would potentially change the assumptions of performance in the 
stock markets. Therefore, this study has examined post-SEO performance and compared to 
theory and results in earlier studies.  
 
6.1 Research Purpose and Contributions  
 
When excluding one particular outlier, a negative statistically significant announcement effect 
can be concluded on the Swedish stock markets in the recovery phase of the financial crisis. 
This particular outlier is excluded because its abnormal return differs substantially from the 
rest of the observations, hinting that other factors than the actual announcement of equity 
offering impacted its result. That being said, one can argue for the following answer to the 
first research question: 
 
The official announcement of an SEO did lead to a negative market reaction on the Swedish 
stock markets during the recovery phase of the financial crisis. 
 
Furthermore, for SEO firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, a statistically significant 
long-run underperformance relative the market can be concluded. However, long-run 
underperformance relative the market cannot be concluded for SEO firms listed on First 
North. Moreover, SEO firms on both stock exchanges generated an economic 
underperformance in terms of negative average cumulative raw returns. A key reason why 
SEO firms on First North did not statistically underperform is the volatility among the firms’ 
individual cumulative abnormal returns. To sum up, the following answer to the second 
research question can be concluded: 
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SEO firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm generated a long-run underperformance 
relative the market in the recovery phase of the financial crisis. 
 
Lastly, for the three independent variables included in the regression, trying to explain long-
run performance, the following answer can be concluded for NASDAQ OMX Stockholm: 
 
Book-to-market ratio has no significant impact on SEO firms’ long-run performance. 
 
Market capitalization has no significant impact on SEO firms’ long-run performance. 
 
Issuing additional equity several times during the time period has a negative impact on SEO 
firms’ long-run performance. 
 
In summary, an overall negative announcement effect was followed up by long-run 
underperformance for SEO firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. Although there are 
signs of long-run underperformance for SEO firms on First North as well, this cannot be 
concluded in this study. An SEO firm issuing additional equity more than once during the 
time period partly explains its long-run underperformance.  
 
This study supports and adds to previous findings that a negative announcement effect and 
long-run underperformance of SEO firms is not unique to the American stock markets. That 
being said, the consequences of the financial crisis did not significantly change the 
assumptions of post-SEO performance in the Swedish stock markets. Moreover, the study 
interprets that during its recovery of a crisis, the stock market OMX Stockholm is not efficient 
in terms of re-evaluating firms’ market value to information of seasoned equity offering 
announcements. Thus, the OMX Stockholm stock market has potentially been biased in its 
initial adjustments to this type of information. Also, this study adds a methodological 
discussion to previous literature regarding the sensitivity of performance results depending on 
what measures and method are used.  
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6.2 Future Research 
 
According to the methodological discussion and analysis, several methodological adjustments 
can be done in order to broaden the analysis of firms’ post-SEO performance. Firstly, using 
market adjusted buy-and-hold return as measurement for long-run performance may generate 
different results for this study’s sample and time period. Future studies within the area, aiming 
to provide more of an investor perspective should preferably use market adjusted buy-and-
hold return as measurement.  
 
Moreover, the authors recommend that future research run regressions for both announcement 
effects and long-run performance, including different independent variables. Such variables 
may analyze the impact of intended use of proceeds, industry or sector belongings, reported 
earnings or profit margin prior to announcement, and certain macroeconomic factors at the 
time of announcement. Lastly, the authors of this study recommend further analysis of how 
firms’ capital structures impact the short- and long-run market reaction of SEO 
announcements. Including an independent variable measuring the percentage change in debt-
to-equity ratio caused by the equity issue would potentially provide further indications of 
capital structure theories’ applicability on Swedish listed firms.  
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Appendix A – Announcement Dates 
 
Announcement Dates and CAR Event Day 3 
Firms Exchange  Announcement Date CAR Event Day 3 
BioInvent International AB OMX Stockholm 12-02-14 -0,1708 
Nordic Mines AB OMX Stockholm 12-03-08 -0,0062 
Artimplant AB OMX Stockholm 12-02-02 0,1452 
Image Systems AB OMX Stockholm 12-01-20 -0,0180 
Transcom WorldWide S.A. OMX Stockholm 11-10-20 -0,0884 
KappAhl AB OMX Stockholm 11-09-30 -0,8564 
Rederi AB Transatlantic OMX Stockholm 11-10-07 0,0079 
Diös Fastigheter AB OMX Stockholm 11-09-22 0,0199 
Oasmia Pharmaceutical AB OMX Stockholm 11-09-30 0,0163 
Opcon AB OMX Stockholm 11-08-24 -0,3512 
Allenex AB OMX Stockholm 11-09-20 -0,2937 
Orexo AB OMX Stockholm 11-05-27 0,0090 
BioInvent International AB OMX Stockholm 11-06-01 -0,0479 
Fastighets AB Balder OMX Stockholm 11-05-09 0,0048 
Swedish Orphan Biovitrum AB OMX Stockholm 11-03-29 -0,0790 
Precise Biometrics AB OMX Stockholm 11-03-28 -0,2990 
Fingerprint Cards AB OMX Stockholm 11-04-11 0,0042 
Hemtex AB OMX Stockholm 11-02-15 -0,0687 
Digital Vision AB OMX Stockholm 11-03-09 0,1350 
Hexpol AB OMX Stockholm 11-01-12 0,0719 
Fastighets AB Balder OMX Stockholm 11-01-24 -0,0479 
MSC Konsult AB OMX Stockholm 10-11-01 -0,0853 
Eniro AB OMX Stockholm 10-10-29 -0,0735 
Hexagon AB OMX Stockholm 10-10-25 -0,0272 
Karo Bio AB OMX Stockholm 10-10-26 -0,2143 
Sensys Traffic AB OMX Stockholm 10-10-12 -0,1655 
Diös Fastigheter AB OMX Stockholm 10-11-01 0,0112 
Nordic Mines AB OMX Stockholm 10-11-15 -0,0110 
Corem Property Group AB OMX Stockholm 10-10-15 -0,0016 
Oasmia Pharmaceutical AB OMX Stockholm 10-10-19 -0,1993 
Artimplant AB OMX Stockholm 10-09-07 -0,0783 
Stockwik Förvaltnings AB OMX Stockholm 10-08-31 -0,2426 
Elanders AB OMX Stockholm 10-08-26 -0,0302 
HQ AB OMX Stockholm 10-05-26 -0,2447 
PA Resources AB OMX Stockholm 10-05-07 -0,2132 
Note AB OMX Stockholm 10-04-07 0,1384 
SAS AB OMX Stockholm 10-04-07 0,1828 
Hemtex AB OMX Stockholm 10-04-05 -0,0687 
Rörvik Timber AB OMX Stockholm 10-02-08 0,5520 
Cision AB OMX Stockholm 10-02-02 0,0455 
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Sagax AB OMX Stockholm 10-02-15 0,0343 
BioInvent International AB OMX Stockholm 10-01-14 -0,0095 
TradeDoubler AB OMX Stockholm 09-11-17 -0,0119 
Gunnebo AB OMX Stockholm 09-10-23 -0,1322 
Haldex AB OMX Stockholm 09-10-23 -0,0467 
Ticket Travel Group AB OMX Stockholm 09-11-03 0,0514 
Rottneros AB OMX Stockholm 09-10-12 0,0951 
Mertiva AB OMX Stockholm 09-09-15 -0,1028 
Fingerprint Cards AB OMX Stockholm 09-09-15 0,0203 
Swedbank AB OMX Stockholm 09-02-05 0,0505 
Eniro AB OMX Stockholm 09-04-27 0,7795 
Cybercom Group AB OMX Stockholm 09-05-20 -0,0076 
Allenex AB OMX Stockholm 09-05-07 -0,0766 
Trelleborg AB OMX Stockholm 09-03-23 0,0185 
Hemtex AB OMX Stockholm 09-03-31 -0,0553 
SAS AB OMX Stockholm 09-02-03 -0,2323 
Nordea Bank AB OMX Stockholm 09-02-10 -0,0129 
Husqvarna AB OMX Stockholm 09-02-20 -0,1191 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB OMX Stockholm 09-02-05 0,1638 
Digital Vision AB OMX Stockholm 09-02-12 -0,0603 
TrustBuddy International AB First North  12-03-28 -0,0170 
Hansa Medical AB First North  11-12-08 -0,1746 
CybAero AB First North  11-01-24 0,0358 
Hansa Medical AB First North  11-12-08 -0,1746 
Seamless Distribution AB First North  11-12-28 0,2649 
Agrokultura AB  First North  11-12-20 0,2252 
World Class Seagull International AB First North  11-11-07 0,0826 
ChronTech Pharma AB First North  11-10-27 -0,0797 
Lightlab Sweden AB First North  11-11-25 -0,5815 
Human Care HC AB First North  11-10-12 -0,0415 
Oniva Online Group Europe AB  First North  11-11-10 -0,0448 
Cryptzone AB First North  11-11-11 -0,1832 
Invisio Communications AB First North  11-10-21 0,0071 
C-RAD AB First North  11-09-16 -0,2530 
Tilgin AB First North  11-08-12 -0,1490 
ChronTech Pharma AB First North  11-07-27 0,1076 
Selena Oil & Gas Holding AB First North  11-06-09 -0,0422 
Mediaprovider Scandinavia AB First North  11-05-19 0,1323 
ADDvise Lab Solutions AB First North  11-06-08 -0,0071 
CybAero AB First North  11-05-04 -0,0835 
Lappland Goldminers AB First North  11-04-29 0,0078 
Cryptzone AB First North  11-06-01 0,0139 
Pilum AB First North  11-05-12 0,0076 
Hansa Medical AB First North  11-05-13 0,0585 
Oniva Online Group Europe AB First North  11-03-16 -0,0938 
Genovis AB First North  11-03-28 0,1366 
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Capilon AB First North  11-04-04 -0,0313 
Agrokultura AB First North  11-02-16 -0,2263 
OraSolv AB First North  11-03-09 -0,1005 
SRAB Shipping AB First North  11-01-20 0,4944 
Lightlab Sweden AB First North  11-01-27 -0,2348 
Seanet Maritime Communications AB First North  11-01-14 0,0174 
Vinovo AB First North  11-11-24 -0,0959 
Arctic Gold AB First North  11-11-16 8,0408 
Invisio Communications AB First North  11-11-19 0,0055 
World Class Seagull International AB First North  10-11-22 -0,0129 
Axlon Group AB First North  11-09-02 0,4300 
RusForest AB First North  10-09-22 -0,0748 
ChronTech Pharma AB First North  10-09-27 -0,1701 
CybAero AB First North  10-10-11 -0,0039 
Cassandra Oil AB First North  10-08-24 -0,6951 
Redbet Holding AB First North  10-08-02 -0,2742 
VKG Energy Services AB First North  10-07-02 -0,0737 
Forestlight Studio AB First North  10-05-10 -1,7893 
Labs2 Group AB First North  10-05-17 -0,0144 
Mediaprovider Scandinavia AB First North  10-05-03 -0,2169 
Impact Coatings AB First North  10-02-03 -0,1115 
Lightlab Sweden AB First North  10-02-02 -0,0450 
Ellen AB First North  09-12-22 -0,0274 
ChronTech Pharma AB  First North  09-11-27 -0,1649 
Agellis Group AB First North  09-11-20 -0,1123 
OraSolv AB First North  09-10-15 -0,1211 
Cassandra Oil AB First North  09-10-14 0,1274 
Bredband2 i Skandinavien AB First North  09-09-29 -0,1003 
Catech AB First North  09-09-23 -0,1053 
Labs2 Group AB First North  09-04-30 0,0128 
Cryptzone AB First North  09-05-06 0,9640 
Lappland Goldminers AB First North  09-03-18 0,0107 
Ellen AB First North  09-03-27 -0,0537 
Petrogrand AB  First North  09-02-13 -0,9744 
Mediaprovider Scandinavia AB First North  09-02-27 0,0009 
Agellis Group AB First North  09-03-11 0,1305 
Oniva Online Group Europe AB First North  09-02-02 -0,1476 
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Appendix B – Variables in Regression 
 
Dependent and Independent Variables in Regression 
Companies 
CAR  
Month 36 
Book-to-
Market 
 Ratio 
LN Market 
Cap (Million 
SEK) 
Dummy 
Several 
Offerings 
Transcom WorldWide S.A. 0,546 1,83 4,404 0 
KappAhl AB 0,288 3,47 8,136 0 
Rederi AB Transatlantic -0,124 -8,08 7,362 0 
Opcon AB -0,425 -2,35 6,201 0 
Orexo AB 1,157 0,86 6,862 0 
Swedish Orphan Biovitrum AB 1,132 0,88 9,059 0 
Precise Biometrics AB 1,041 0,96 5,780 0 
Hexpol AB 1,330 0,75 8,267 0 
Fastighets AB Balder 0,731 1,37 8,331 1 
MSC Konsult AB -0,031 -32,69 2,954 0 
Hexagon AB 0,362 2,77 10,197 0 
Karo Bio AB 0,530 1,89 6,995 0 
Sensys Traffic AB 1,101 0,91 6,181 0 
Diös Fastigheter AB -0,002 -515,94 6,858 1 
Nordic Mines AB -3,184 -0,31 6,515 1 
Corem Property Group AB -0,186 -5,36 7,257 0 
Oasmia Pharmaceutical AB 0,501 1,99 6,763 1 
Artimplant AB -1,562 -0,64 4,708 1 
Stockwik Förvaltnings AB -0,274 -3,66 3,964 0 
Elanders AB -0,094 -10,59 5,758 0 
HQ AB -2,059 -0,49 8,104 0 
PA Resources AB -3,494 -0,29 8,325 0 
Note AB -0,122 -8,19 5,323 0 
Rörvik Timber AB -1,938 -0,52 4,717 0 
Cision AB 0,082 12,26 6,206 0 
Sagax AB 0,551 1,82 6,969 0 
BioInvent International AB -1,236 -0,81 7,254 1 
TradeDoubler AB -1,238 -0,81 6,964 0 
Gunnebo AB 0,300 3,33 6,559 0 
Haldex AB 1,081 0,93 6,389 0 
Ticket Travel Group AB 0,064 15,60 3,965 0 
Rottneros AB -1,367 -0,73 5,288 0 
Diamyd Medical AB -0,647 -1,55 6,218 0 
Fingerprint Cards AB 0,294 3,41 4,113 1 
Swedbank AB 0,530 1,89 10,038 0 
Eniro AB -2,500 -0,40 7,460 1 
Cybercom Group AB -0,430 -2,33 5,752 0 
Allenex AB -2,223 -0,45 5,004 1 
Trelleborg AB 0,875 1,14 8,268 0 
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Hemtex AB -1,203 -0,83 6,056 1 
SAS AB -2,145 -0,47 8,738 1 
Nordea Bank AB -0,144 -6,93 11,865 0 
Husqvarna AB -0,146 -6,85 9,379 0 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 0,344 2,91 10,604 0 
Image Systems AB  -3,254 0,00 3,054 0 
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Appendix C – Boxplots Announcement Effect 
 
Boxplots for Event Day 1 and 3 
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Appendix D – Year-by-Year Results 
 
Average and Median CAR Event Day 3 Year-by-Year for both Exchanges Separately 
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Appendix E – Test Stats Announcement Effect 
 
Variables used for Test Statistics for Average and Median CAR Event Day 3 
Event Day Average AR 
Average 
CAR Median AR Median CAR Var(avg AR) VAR(avg CAR) 
1 -0,04435 -0,04435 -0,02041 -0,02041 0,00027 0,00027 
2 0,05093 0,00658 -0,00780 -0,02822 0,00441 0,00468 
3 0,00252 0,00910 -0,00121 -0,02942 0,00012 0,00480 
 
Variables used for Test Statistics for Average and Median CAR Event Day 3 Excluding Arctic Gold AB 
Event Day Average AR 
Average 
CAR Var(avg AR) VAR(avg CAR) 
1 -0,04435 -0,04435 0,000275 0,000275 
2 -0,0146 -0,0590 0,000179 0,000454 
3 0,00225 -0,0567 0,000125 0,000580 
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Appendix F – CAR Long-Run Performance 
 
Raw Return and CAR Month 1 through 36 
 
  
Month 
 Raw Return 
OMX 
Stockholm 
Raw Return 
First North 
Raw Return 
Combined 
CAR OMX 
Stockholm 
CAR First 
North 
CAR 
Combined 
1  0,0134 0,0135 0,0134 -0,0114 -0,0145 -0,0128 
2  0,0045 -0,0216 -0,0071 -0,0324 -0,0245 -0,0289 
3  0,0581 0,0814 0,0684 0,0048 0,0745 0,0358 
4  0,0801 0,0822 0,0810 0,0146 0,0891 0,0477 
5  0,1053 0,0623 0,0862 0,0301 0,0598 0,0433 
6  0,1005 0,0520 0,0789 0,0186 0,0679 0,0405 
7  0,0994 0,0625 0,0830 0,0163 0,0811 0,0451 
8  0,0885 0,0369 0,0656 -0,0022 0,0802 0,0344 
9  0,0544 0,0318 0,0444 -0,0166 0,0662 0,0202 
10  0,0766 -0,0124 0,0370 -0,0168 0,0300 0,0040 
11  0,0701 -0,0233 0,0286 -0,0187 0,0161 -0,0032 
12  0,0582 -0,0408 0,0142 -0,0418 -0,0019 -0,0240 
13  0,0761 -0,0537 0,0184 -0,0328 -0,0078 -0,0217 
14  0,0610 -0,0691 0,0032 -0,0613 -0,0164 -0,0413 
15  0,0680 -0,1258 -0,0182 -0,0661 -0,0762 -0,0706 
16  0,0382 -0,1577 -0,0489 -0,1039 -0,1154 -0,1090 
17  0,0340 -0,1844 -0,0631 -0,1059 -0,1232 -0,1136 
18  0,0031 -0,2139 -0,0934 -0,1295 -0,1513 -0,1392 
19  -0,0606 -0,2487 -0,1442 -0,1970 -0,1825 -0,1906 
20  -0,0928 -0,2652 -0,1694 -0,2326 -0,1962 -0,2164 
21  -0,0819 -0,2899 -0,1743 -0,2203 -0,2192 -0,2198 
22  -0,0910 -0,2967 -0,1824 -0,2345 -0,2319 -0,2333 
23  -0,0798 -0,3014 -0,1783 -0,2306 -0,2199 -0,2258 
24  -0,0927 -0,3132 -0,1907 -0,2451 -0,2345 -0,2404 
25  -0,0885 -0,2882 -0,1772 -0,2561 -0,2075 -0,2345 
26  -0,0263 -0,3436 -0,1673 -0,2020 -0,2544 -0,2253 
27  -0,0052 -0,3499 -0,1584 -0,1965 -0,2707 -0,2295 
28  -0,0317 -0,3124 -0,1564 -0,2223 -0,2218 -0,2221 
29  -0,0292 -0,0013 -0,0168 -0,2160 0,0857 -0,0819 
30  -0,1129 0,0349 -0,0472 -0,3032 0,1176 -0,1162 
31  -0,1308 -0,0080 -0,0762 -0,3145 0,0554 -0,1501 
32  -0,0984 -0,0733 -0,0872 -0,2946 0,0010 -0,1632 
33  -0,1150 -0,1140 -0,1146 -0,3308 -0,0594 -0,2102 
34  -0,1339 -0,1204 -0,1279 -0,3636 -0,0828 -0,2388 
35  -0,1140 -0,1266 -0,1196 -0,3667 -0,1078 -0,2516 
36  -0,1206 -0,1108 -0,1163 -0,3820 -0,1049 -0,2588 
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Appendix G – Long-Run Performance 
 
Test Statistics for CAR Month 36 
Test Statistics CAR Number of 
Obs. 
Standard 
Deviation 
Test Statistics 
OMX Stockholm -0.382 45 1.256 -2.04 
First North -0.105 36 2.355 -0.27 
Both Exchanges Combined -0.259 81 1.833 -1.27 
 
 
Boxplot for CAR Month 36 
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Appendix H – Regression for both Exchanges 
Combined 
 
OLS Regression 
Dependent Variable: CAR_MONTH_36  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 11:34   
Sample: 1 81    
Included observations: 81   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO -0.042139 0.144627 -0.291365 0.7716 
LN_MARKET_CAP 0.019230 0.097476 0.197276 0.8441 
DUMMY_SEVERAL_OFFERING
S 0.004390 0.455150 0.009645 0.9923 
C -0.319227 0.662828 -0.481614 0.6314 
     
     R-squared 0.001810    Mean dependent var -0.258846 
Adjusted R-squared -0.037080    S.D. dependent var 1.844718 
S.E. of regression 1.878608    Akaike info criterion 4.147061 
Sum squared resid 271.7460    Schwarz criterion 4.265305 
Log likelihood -163.9560    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.194502 
F-statistic 0.046542    Durbin-Watson stat 1.846452 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.986583    
     
     
 
 
Heteroskedasticity: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey & White’s Test 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
F-statistic 1.050007    Prob. F(3,77) 0.3754 
Obs*R-squared 3.183427    Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.3642 
Scaled explained SS 28.50310    Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.0000 
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 11:38   
Sample: 1 81    
Included observations: 81   
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 6.239586 5.297138 1.177916 0.2425 
BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO -0.773936 1.155817 -0.669601 0.5051 
LN_MARKET_CAP -0.626725 0.779001 -0.804524 0.4236 
DUMMY_SEVERAL_OFFERINGS 4.618254 3.637437 1.269645 0.2080 
     
R-squared 0.039302    Mean dependent var 3.354888 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001872    S.D. dependent var 15.02739 
S.E. of regression 15.01332    Akaike info criterion 8.303874 
Sum squared resid 17355.77    Schwarz criterion 8.422118 
Log likelihood -332.3069    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.351315 
F-statistic 1.050007    Durbin-Watson stat 2.066132 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.375395    
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Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 0.771575    Prob. F(8,72) 0.6288 
Obs*R-squared 6.395854    Prob. Chi-Square(8) 0.6030 
Scaled explained SS 57.26584    Prob. Chi-Square(8) 0.0000 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 11:38   
Sample: 1 81    
Included observations: 81   
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 6.837706 12.31031 0.555445 0.5803 
BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO^2 0.432121 0.580234 0.744737 0.4589 
BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO*LN_MARKET_
CAP 0.916243 1.065759 0.859710 0.3928 
BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO*DUMMY_SEV
ERAL_OFFERINGS -2.593343 4.640579 -0.558840 0.5780 
BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO -7.223810 8.517242 -0.848139 0.3992 
LN_MARKET_CAP^2 -0.046292 0.312604 -0.148086 0.8827 
LN_MARKET_CAP*DUMMY_SEVERAL_OFF
ERINGS -2.450759 2.064984 -1.186817 0.2392 
LN_MARKET_CAP -0.443100 3.938044 -0.112518 0.9107 
DUMMY_SEVERAL_OFFERINGS^2 20.83339 12.11179 1.720092 0.0897 
     
     R-squared 0.078961    Mean dependent var 3.354888 
Adjusted R-squared -0.023376    S.D. dependent var 15.02739 
S.E. of regression 15.20201    Akaike info criterion 8.385172 
Sum squared resid 16639.29    Schwarz criterion 8.651222 
Log likelihood -330.5995    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.491915 
F-statistic 0.771575    Durbin-Watson stat 2.121039 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.628806    
     
     
 
 
Multicollinearity: Correlation Matrix 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary    
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 11:34    
Sample: 1 81     
Included observations: 81    
      
      Correlation     
Probability 
CAR_MONTH_
36  
BOOK_TO_MA
RKET_RATIO  
LN_MARKET_
CAP  
DUMMY_SEVE
RAL_OFFERIN
GS   
CAR_MONTH_36  1.000000     
 -----      
      
BOOK_TO_MARKET
_RATIO  -0.036013 1.000000    
 0.7496 -----     
79 
 
      
LN_MARKET_CAP  0.026367 -0.107547 1.000000   
 0.8153 0.3392 -----    
      
DUMMY_SEVERAL_
OFFERINGS  -0.000741 -0.060707 -0.169504 1.000000  
 0.9948 0.5903 0.1303 -----   
      
      
 
 
Normality: Jarque-Bera Tests 
 
CAR_MONTH_
36 
BOOK_TO_MA
RKET_RATIO 
LN_MARKET_C
AP 
DUMMY_SEVE
RAL_OFFERIN
GS 
 Mean -0.258846  1.138679  5.561987  0.320988 
 Median -0.145925  0.833333  5.415167  0.000000 
 Maximum  11.36127  11.11111  11.86517  1.000000 
 Minimum -3.763568  0.000000  1.232560  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  1.844718  1.465490  2.202229  0.469765 
 Skewness  2.814709  4.205390  0.435218  0.766885 
 Kurtosis  20.72153  27.75092  2.943496  1.588112 
     
 Jarque-Bera  1166.882  2306.304  2.567880  14.66733 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.276944  0.000653 
     
 Sum -20.96654  92.23301  450.5209  26.00000 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  272.2387  171.8129  387.9850  17.65432 
     
 Observations  81  81  81  81 
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1 81
Observations 81
Mean       3.29e-17
Median   0.105895
Maximum  11.62234
Minimum -3.487608
Std. Dev.   1.843048
Skewness   2.819424
Kurtosis   20.81599
Jarque-Bera  1178.570
Probability  0.000000
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Non-Linearity: Ramsey RESET Test 
Ramsey RESET Test   
Equation: UNTITLED   
Specification: CAR_MONTH_36 BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO 
        LN_MARKET_CAP DUMMY_SEVERAL_OFFERINGS C 
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values  
     
      Value df Probability  
t-statistic  0.413313  76  0.6805  
F-statistic  0.170828 (1, 76)  0.6805  
Likelihood ratio  0.181862  1  0.6698  
     
     F-test summary:   
 Sum of Sq. df 
Mean 
Squares  
Test SSR  0.609442  1  0.609442  
Restricted SSR  271.7460  77  3.529168  
Unrestricted SSR  271.1365  76  3.567586  
     
     LR test summary:   
 Value df   
Restricted LogL -163.9560  77   
Unrestricted LogL -163.8650  76   
     
          
Unrestricted Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: CAR_MONTH_36  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 11:39   
Sample: 1 81    
Included observations: 81   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO -0.246151 0.514575 -0.478358 0.6338 
LN_MARKET_CAP 0.079877 0.176454 0.452679 0.6521 
DUMMY_SEVERAL_OFFERING
S 0.026267 0.460672 0.057018 0.9547 
C -0.842290 1.430282 -0.588898 0.5577 
FITTED^2 5.623932 13.60696 0.413313 0.6805 
     
     R-squared 0.004049    Mean dependent var -0.258846 
Adjusted R-squared -0.048370    S.D. dependent var 1.844718 
S.E. of regression 1.888805    Akaike info criterion 4.169507 
Sum squared resid 271.1365    Schwarz criterion 4.317313 
Log likelihood -163.8650    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.228809 
F-statistic 0.077238    Durbin-Watson stat 1.862727 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.989003    
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Appendix I – Regression for OMX Stockholm 
 
OLS Regression 
Dependent Variable: CAR_MONTH_36  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 11:11   
Sample: 1 45    
Included observations: 45   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO 0.015347 0.181903 0.084369 0.9332 
LN_MARKET_CAP 0.105292 0.093475 1.126421 0.2665 
DUMMY_SEVERAL_OFFERING
S -0.963830 0.425003 -2.267817 0.0287 
C -0.877877 0.718508 -1.221806 0.2288 
     
     R-squared 0.143978    Mean dependent var -0.381987 
Adjusted R-squared 0.081342    S.D. dependent var 1.270609 
S.E. of regression 1.217836    Akaike info criterion 3.316716 
Sum squared resid 60.80813    Schwarz criterion 3.477308 
Log likelihood -70.62611    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.376583 
F-statistic 2.298647    Durbin-Watson stat 1.420375 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.091665    
     
     
 
 
Heteroskedasticity: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey & White’s Test 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     F-statistic 0.568894    Prob. F(3,41) 0.6387 
Obs*R-squared 1.798329    Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.6153 
Scaled explained SS 1.961171    Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.5805 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 11:20   
Sample: 1 45    
Included observations: 45   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.120376 1.326529 1.598439 0.1176 
BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO -0.387916 0.335834 -1.155083 0.2547 
LN_MARKET_CAP -0.060184 0.172576 -0.348742 0.7291 
DUMMY_SEVERAL_OFFERING
S 0.329660 0.784653 0.420135 0.6766 
     
     R-squared 0.039963    Mean dependent var 1.351292 
Adjusted R-squared -0.030284    S.D. dependent var 2.215113 
S.E. of regression 2.248404    Akaike info criterion 4.543005 
Sum squared resid 207.2681    Schwarz criterion 4.703598 
Log likelihood -98.21762    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.602873 
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F-statistic 0.568894    Durbin-Watson stat 1.795949 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.638662    
     
     
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 0.395340    Prob. F(8,36) 0.9158 
Obs*R-squared 3.634133    Prob. Chi-Square(8) 0.8885 
Scaled explained SS 3.963210    Prob. Chi-Square(8) 0.8604 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 11:21   
Sample: 1 45    
Included observations: 45   
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.445370 3.816201 1.164868 0.2517 
BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO^2 0.252476 0.313912 0.804287 0.4265 
BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO*LN_MARKET_
CAP 0.221654 0.232592 0.952972 0.3470 
BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO*DUMMY_SEV
ERAL_OFFERINGS 0.530100 0.906435 0.584819 0.5623 
BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO -2.715379 2.044091 -1.328404 0.1924 
LN_MARKET_CAP^2 0.001455 0.074499 0.019532 0.9845 
LN_MARKET_CAP*DUMMY_SEVERAL_OFF
ERINGS 0.304950 0.562983 0.541667 0.5914 
LN_MARKET_CAP -0.358637 1.030905 -0.347885 0.7300 
DUMMY_SEVERAL_OFFERINGS^2 -2.173476 3.970978 -0.547340 0.5875 
     
     R-squared 0.080759    Mean dependent var 1.351292 
Adjusted R-squared -0.123517    S.D. dependent var 2.215113 
S.E. of regression 2.347933    Akaike info criterion 4.721805 
Sum squared resid 198.4605    Schwarz criterion 5.083137 
Log likelihood -97.24060    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.856506 
F-statistic 0.395340    Durbin-Watson stat 1.849905 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.915801    
     
     
 
 
Multicollinearity: Correlation Matrix 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 11:15   
Sample: 1 45    
Included observations: 45   
     
     Correlation    
Probability 
CAR_MONTH_
36  
BOOK_TO_MA
RKET_RATIO  
LN_MARKET_
CAP  
DUMMY_SEVE
RAL_OFFERIN
GS  
CAR_MONTH_36  1.000000    
 -----     
     
BOOK_TO_MARKET
_RATIO  0.029994 1.000000   
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 0.8449 -----    
     
LN_MARKET_CAP  0.187308 -0.047433 1.000000  
 0.2179 0.7570 -----   
     
DUMMY_SEVERAL_
OFFERINGS  -0.342745 -0.077352 -0.074145 1.000000 
 0.0212 0.6135 0.6284 -----  
     
     
 
 
Normality: Jarque-Bera Test 
 
CAR_MONTH_
36 
BOOK_TO_MA
RKET_RATIO 
LN_MARKET_C
AP 
DUMMY_SEVE
RAL_OFFERIN
GS 
 Mean -0.381987  1.138224  6.781382  0.244444 
 Median -0.094400  1.041667  6.762845  0.000000 
 Maximum  1.329908  4.166667  11.86517  1.000000 
 Minimum -3.494125  0.000000  2.954389  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  1.270609  1.013791  1.972365  0.434613 
 Skewness -0.888160  1.114385  0.295988  1.189302 
 Kurtosis  2.896355  3.659230  2.951085  2.414439 
     
 Jarque-Bera  5.936358  10.12875  0.661553  11.25119 
 Probability  0.051397  0.006318  0.718366  0.003604 
     
 Sum -17.18942  51.22006  305.1622  11.00000 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  71.03567  45.22199  171.1699  8.311111 
     
 Observations  45  45  45  45 
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1 45
Observations 45
Mean       9.87e-18
Median   0.155037
Maximum  1.687627
Minimum -3.510073
Std. Dev.   1.175586
Skewness  -0.885495
Kurtosis   3.627445
Jarque-Bera  6.618918
Probability  0.036536
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Non-Linearity: Ramey RESET Test 
Ramsey RESET Test   
Equation: UNTITLED   
Specification: CAR_MONTH_36 BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO 
        LN_MARKET_CAP DUMMY_SEVERAL_OFFERINGS C 
Omitted Variables: Squares of fitted values  
     
      Value df Probability  
t-statistic  0.202207  40  0.8408  
F-statistic  0.040888 (1, 40)  0.8408  
Likelihood ratio  0.045975  1  0.8302  
     
     F-test summary:   
 Sum of Sq. df 
Mean 
Squares  
Test SSR  0.062094  1  0.062094  
Restricted SSR  60.80813  41  1.483125  
Unrestricted SSR  60.74604  40  1.518651  
     
     LR test summary:   
 Value df   
Restricted LogL -70.62611  41   
Unrestricted LogL -70.60312  40   
     
          
Unrestricted Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: CAR_MONTH_36  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/15   Time: 11:26   
Sample: 1 45    
Included observations: 45   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     BOOK_TO_MARKET_RATIO 0.015814 0.184083 0.085905 0.9320 
LN_MARKET_CAP 0.117420 0.112002 1.048377 0.3008 
DUMMY_SEVERAL_OFFERING
S -1.265669 1.553442 -0.814751 0.4200 
C -0.978128 0.880013 -1.111493 0.2730 
FITTED^2 0.244527 1.209289 0.202207 0.8408 
     
     R-squared 0.144852    Mean dependent var -0.381987 
Adjusted R-squared 0.059337    S.D. dependent var 1.270609 
S.E. of regression 1.232336    Akaike info criterion 3.360139 
Sum squared resid 60.74604    Schwarz criterion 3.560879 
Log likelihood -70.60312    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.434973 
F-statistic 1.693878    Durbin-Watson stat 1.417161 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.170437    
     
     
 
